

Chronology Of Events In Brazil 1964-73

1964

March 31-April 2: Revolution of March 31; military coup overthrows populist regime of João Goulart.
April 9: Institutional Act I institutes "revolutionary government".
April-July: Wholesale purges throughout military, unions, Congress, judiciary, civil service, state and local governments.
April 16: General Castelo Branco elected president by Congress.
May 9: Carlos Marighella injured in shootout with police.
July: Purges decline as regime consolidates; Carlos Lacerda, one of the initiators
October: Leadership of Brazilian Communist Party arrested; purge re instituted.
November 26: Goiás Governor Borges ousted for subversion.
November 27: Two hundred jailed in Rio Grande do Sul for allegedly plotting leftist insurrection in conjunction with Borges and ex-deputy Leonel Brizola.

1965

March 17: New York Times reports 2.000 people in jail without charges.
March 27: Guerrilla raid on barracks in Rio Grande do Sul.
May 18: Bomb found in United States Embassy.
October 27: Institutional Act II; Castelo Branco dissolves political parties, increases executive powers, decrees appointment of judges and indirect election of future presidents.

1966

February 5: Bombing of home of United States consul in Pôrto Alegre.
June 24: U.S.I.S. building in Brasília bombed.
July: Bomb at Recife airport kills three; assassination attempt on General Costa e Silva; hundreds arrested.
September 15-23: Students demonstrate and clash with police in Rio.
October 4: Bombings of war, finance and foreign ministers' homes.
December 1: A.P. Pimentel sentenced to 5 years in prison for attempted assassination of Castelo Branco in 1965.
December 10: Carlos Marighella and others resign from Communist Party Executive Committee.

1967

Early 1967: Mario Alves and others found Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party.
March 15: Costa e Silva becomes president; new Constitution inaugurated.
Early April: Rural foco in Serra de Caparão aborted; MNR and (allegedly) Leonel Brizola involved.
August: First OLAS (Organization of Latin American Solidarity) Conference held in Havana; Carlos Marighella is one of the Brazilian delegates.
August 1: Peace Corps office in Rios bombed.
August 20: 170 suspected guerrillas seized in Mato Grosso; led by Tarzan de Castro.
September 27: United States air attaché's residence in Rio bombed.
October 15: 5 persons arrested for attempting to form guerrilla band in Amazonas.
December 30: Ten boxes of dynamite and 200 detonators taken from Cajamar cement company.
Late 1967: Marighella returns to Brazil and begins mobilizing ALN.

1968

January: Beginnings of several guerrilla groups: VPR in São Paulo and MR-8 in Niteroi.
March 19: United States Consulate in São Paulo bombed.
March 28: Edson Luis Soto, 16-year-old student, killed by police in Rio de Janeiro.
March 30: Student demonstration in Rio protests killing of students by administration.
April 15: French and Italian Bank armored car attacked: 100,000 NCr (New Cruzeiros) expropriated.
April 20: Conservative newspaper O Estado do São Paulo bombed by VPR.
April 23: Commerce and Industry Bank in São Paulo robbed by guerrillas.
May 1: Governor Abreu Sodre stoned by mob in Sao Paulo.
June 20-21: Students clash with police in Rio and demonstrate in São Paulo and Brasília; 1,500 arrested.
June 22: São Paulo Army Hospital raided for weapons in first direct attack on army by the VPR.
June 26: One hundred thousand students demonstrate in protest against repression. Second Army headquarters in Ibirapuera bombed by VPR.
June 28: Nineteen boxes of dynamite and blasting caps stolen from Fortaleza stone quarry by VPR.
July: Students occupy University of São Paulo Philosophy Faculty; first death-squad attacks initiate backlash to 1968 turmoil. Osasco metal workers strike, led by union head and VPR leader Jose Ibrahim; increased repression follows.
July 13: Peasant leader Manoel Conceicao shot by police; he eventually loses a leg from gangrene.
August 10: Payroll train attacked; 110,000 NCr expropriated.
October: MR-8 foco in Parana begun; first support action executed.
October 12: U.S. Captain Charles Chandler assassinated by VPR in Sao Paulo. Eight hundred students arrested for holding congress of outlawed National Student Union.
October 14: Seizure of 180,000 NCr from Bank of Sao Paulo.
October 27: Sears, Roebuck & Company store bombed.
November: Bank assault linked to Marighella and the ALN; realization by police of "subversive threat."

December 12: Congress balks at government demand for trial of Deputy Marcio Moreira Alves for insulting military honor; climax of a long "constitutional crisis".
December 13: Costa e Silva closes Congress; Institutional Act V promulgated, giving president dictatorial powers.
December 14-18: Hundreds arrested including 94 government party deputies, ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek and Carlos Lacerda.

1969

January 22: Planned action against IV Army Quitauna barracks uncovered, exposing VPR.
January 25: Captain Carlos Lamarca, with three non commissioned officers and 70 automatic weapons, defects to VPR.
February 25: Expropriation of 120,000 NCr from Auxiliary Bank of São Paulo.
March: Residence of General Ademar de Rocha Santos bombed.
April: Monguagua Conference held to reorganize VPR and attempt merger with COLINA; initially there is little success, but soon after the two groups join to form VAR-Palmares.
May 1: Guerrillas seize São Bernardo radio station and broadcast message.
May 5: Seizure of 248,000 NCr from National Credit Bank.
May 27: Six guerrillas escape Lemos de Brito prison and become involved in MAR foco.
June: Operation Bandeirante launched nationwide to combat subversion.
June 22: Military police barracks attacked; weapons and ammunition expropriated.
July: Political parties reorganized by government decree. Over 30 MR-8 members arrested.
July 8: Two theatres showing "The Green Berets" bombed.
July 18: \$2.4 million taken from estate of politician Adhemar de Barros.
August: MAR guerrillas driven out of forests of Angra dos Reis, 200 miles south of Rio de Janeiro. Over 200 revolutionaries arrested during mid-1969.
August 15: Marighella speech read over Radio Sao Paulo during occupation by guerrillas.
September 4: United States Ambassador Burke Elbrick kidnapped by ALN and MR-8; 15 prisoners exchanged for Elbrick.
September 10: Institutional Act XIV decrees death penalty for subversion; first time death penalty has been decreed since 1891; some 1,800 persons arrested following Elbrick kidnapping.
September: Tarresopolis Conference results in split within VAR Palmares; armed struggle wing leaves and calls itself VPR again.
Late September: Thirteen ALN factories raided by authorities.
November 4: Carlos Marighella trapped and shot to death
December 17: Shooting incident leads to discovery of PCBR urban guerrilla activity; campaign against PCBR begins.



1970

January: João Domingues Palmares commando (VAR) hijacks airplane. Subsequently the VAR is hit hard by repression.
January 13: PCBR continues to face repression, culminating in arrests of Mario Alves (who dies under torture) and Apolonio de Carvalho.
February 20: Death of Antonio Raimundo de Lucena, VPR leader, during police raid.
March 11: Japanese consul Nobuo Okuchi abducted by VPR; 5 prisoners exchanged for Okuchi.
April 5: Curtis Cutter, United States consul in Pôrto Alegre, thwarts kidnap.
April 21: ALN leader Juarez Guimarez de Brito killed in attempted kidnapping of West German Ambassador von Holleben.
April 21-May 31: Operation Vale de Ribeira mobilizes thousands of troops to eliminate VPR training camp headed by Lamarca.
June 11: West German ambassador kidnapped by Juarez Guimarez de Brito commando of ALN and VPR; 44 prisoners released in exchange for him.
July 12: Eduardo Leites (VPR) arrested in attempted skyjacking to free prisoners.
July: ALN, MR-8, VPR, MRT begin merger into United Front.
August 12: Carlos Franklin Peiyao de Araujy (VAR) arrested.
September: PCBR joins United Front effort. VAR suffers another split, led by Adilson Ferreira da Silva.
October 1-3: Operation Sao Paulo; police campaign against Sao Paulo guerrillas; 500 arrested, including most of VAR-Palmares, Sao Paulo branch.
October 23: Joaquim Camara Ferreira, successor to Marighella as head of ALN, arrested and dies of "heart attack" in prison.
November: Grandson of Marshall Lott savagely tortured; Lott kills army captain in revenge, and demands public trial; military quietly retires him. Arms cache in Sao Paulo tombs discovered.

November 4-5: Operation Cage launched to pre-empt guerrilla actions commemorating Marighella's death; 5-10,000 people detained.
November 15: Elections: 30% of electorate abstain despite illegality of abstention; 55% cast blank ballots.
December 3: Education Minister Jarbas Passarinho admits to occasional use of torture in jails.
December 7: Swiss Ambassador Giovanni Bucher kidnapped by Juarez Guimarez de Brito commando of ALN; 70 prisoners released.
December 8: Police announce death of three guerrillas, including Eduardo Leite (VPR).
December 10: Expropriation of 64,000 NCr from Itau-America Bank; police claim 9 of 14 commandos captured within 2 days.

1971

January 12: VAR-Palmares distributes food to slum dwellers.
January 20: Rubens Paiva (labour party ex-deputy linked to guerrillas) and family arrested; Paiva dies under torture.
February 6: Raids in Recife lead to captured documents and whereabouts of guerrillas, including Tarzan de Castro.
March 11: \$35,000 expropriated from 3 private firms.
March 12: Five VAR-Palmares members arrested.
March 14: \$13,800 seized from supermarket.
March 23: Marcio Leite Toledo (VPR) killed in Sio Paulo; links leading to Carlos Lamarca allegedly discovered.
April 5: MRT leader Devanir Joss de Carvalho arrested and killed.
April 14: Major Toja Martinez assassinated in Rio.
April 15: Conservative industrialist Henning Albert Boilesen assassinated by MRT in retribution for death of Carvalho.
April 18: Dimas Antonio Cassemiro of MRT killed.
April 23: MR-8 student cell at Rio de Janeiro Federal University broken.
May 1: Zilda Xavier Periera (ALN) escapes Pinel Hospital in Rio.
May 16: Two presses seized by guerrillas from printing press factory.
May 28: Five guerrillas from VAR-Palmares arrested. MR-8 cell broken up.
June 23: Jose Anselmo dos Santos, ex-navy corporal and leader of naval insurrection of March 26, 1964, allegedly dies in prison.
July 22: Guerrillas seize 350,000 NCr from bank.
July 24: Joao Carlos dos Santos, leader of group which kidnapped von Holleben, captured.
August 5: Jose Raimundo Costa (VPR) shot to death resisting arrest.
September 18: Carlos Lamarca killed in Salvador, Bahia.

1972

January 19: Alex de Paula Xavier-Pereira (ALN) killed.
January 23: Peasant leaders Manoel de Conceicao and Luis Campos arrested.
April: Armed resistance begins in Amazonia State.
April 11: Antonio Caros Nogueira Cabral (ALN) killed in Rio de Janeiro.
April 29: Eighteen AP members sentenced to prison. Garage of Myers Craig (director of Brazilian Johnson & Johnson) bombed.
June 14: Luri de Paula Xavier Pereira (ALN)
July 18: Trial of 5 VPR members in Sao Paulo.
August 2: Aloisio dos Santos Filhos (PCB foreign affairs committee) taken.
August 12: Fuad Saad (head of PCB foreign affairs) arrested.
September 22: Manoel de Conceicao brought to trial.
September 25: 5000 troops sent to Xambia, Amazonia in counter-insurgency action.
September 28: Police station in Garibaldi, Rio Grande do Sul, raided for weapons.
October 3: Seventeen AP and PRT cadres put on trial.
October 21: Nineteen urban guerrillas (MLN) arrested.
November 2: Two guerrillas (MOLIPO) killed in Sao Paulo shootout.

November 22: Twenty-two PCB members arrested in Sao Paulo.
December 3: Joao Felipe de Sampiao Lacerda (PCB) arrested; 6 other foreign affairs cadre taken soon after.
December 6: Six PCB members arrested in Campo Grande district of Rio de Janeiro.
December 8: PCB sections hit in Goias and Rio de Janeiro.
December 11: Four Trotskyites arrested in Sao Paulo. Ro de Janeiro.
December 29: Six PCBR members killed and one captured including two National Command members.

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January 5: Six bombings in Fortaleza, Ceara.
January 10: 6th VPR cadre (including 1 Paraguayan) shot in 1 week near Recife.
January 11: Government announces arrests of 32 members of ALN splinter group MOLIPO in Sao Paulo. VPR denounces Jose Anselmo for defection; his information allegedly set up recent assassinations in Recife, plus others.
January 17: Nine leftists killed in Rio de Janeiro.
January 24: EX-PCB deputy Jose Maria Crispim and daughter sentenced in absentia for association with VPR. Anatalia de Melo Alves (PCB) tortured to death in Pernambuco.
February 7: Rubens Berado, deputy and former vice-governor of Guanabara, killed by unknown assailants. British naval officer David Cuthberg assassinated
February 21: Manuel Henrique de Oliveira, Portuguese national and alleged police informer, executed by Aurora Maria Nacimientto Furtado command.
March 1: Sao Paulo police agent Octavio Gonzalves Moreira killed in Guanabara.



MINI MANUAL DE GUERRILLA URBANA

An English Translation of Carlos Marighella's 1969

Mini Manual of the Urban Guerrilla

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Editors Introduction:

The Mini Manual of the Urban Guerilla is a guide to overthrowing dictatorships from urban bases of operation. It was written by Carlos Marighella in 1969, shortly before his assassination by state forces. Marighella was a Brazilian politician, writer, and devout communist who fought against the Brazilian military dictatorship lasting from 1964 to 1985. Marighella formed the Ação Libertadora Nacional (National Liberation Action) group, an urban guerilla cell known for its bank robberies, bombings, arms expropriations, assassinations, and several high-profile kidnappings. The cell operated lasted from roughly 1967 to 1974, by when almost every member of the group had either been killed in combat or captured and tortured to death.

The mini manual was developed by Marighella with consideration of prior successful communist revolutions such as in Cuba and China but written with the material conditions of Brazil in mind. Unlike Cuba and China, communist revolutionaries in Brazil did not have the support of the populace. The 1964 CIA backed military coup against João Goulart, a left-wing democratically elected president, was generally supported by most Brazilians, and only more radical groups such as the Marxists, unionists, and students directly opposed it.

Many of the old-school communist guerrillas believed that revolution would be impossible without rural support and bases of operation. Even Mao once mused that revolution would be impossible in a county without a countryside, such as Belgium. However, rapid industrialization and the movement of population centers from rural to urban areas changed the equation, and by the 60’s rural guerilla movements often faltered where they once had flourished. A 1971 report by the RAND corporation on rural guerrillas noted that “they control the mountain tops; the governments against which they fought still controlled the nations.”

Even if guerilla movements were unable to secure popular support in the countryside, the opportunities for attack and building revolutionary movements now lived in urban centers anyways. Guerrillas of the 60’s and 70’s brought the fight to the cities, attacking centers of power on their own doorsteps and then melting back into their cover identities amongst the urban population. A 1969 CIA intelligence memorandum on Latin American urban terrorism summarizes this point for us neatly, “Revolutionaries and reformers of all types are now becoming increasingly aware that the key to political power not in their countryside, where insurgency has thus far failed, but in the cities.”

Considering this, Marighella excelled in using a variety of urban guerilla tactics to effect quick and decisive attacks on power while also growing revolutionary capability and popular support for the Ação Libertadora Nacional. This two-pronged strategy, attacking power and building capability, can be summarized into two general themes, armed propaganda and terrorism (non-derogatory).

Armed propaganda is used to both support the urban guerilla's physical needs as well as to project an image of combative strength against the state, which serves as propaganda. Literal propaganda such as underground print news and pirate radio was also used by Marighella, but he emphasizes the importance of attacks on the state to show the capabilities of the guerrillas while demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the state. Expropriations of arms, bank robberies, kidnapping of officials, and mass protest movements all fall into this category.

The second prong, terrorism, is less easy to define but still an important part of the urban guerilla's repertoire according to Marighella. Terrorism effects attacks directly towards the state and other facets of power, particularly north American imperialist companies in Brazil’s case. While terrorism is also a form of propaganda in its own way, to the urban guerilla it is focused more on diminishing the capabilities of the state rather than building their own capabilities. Examples of terrorist tactics used by urban guerrillas include sabotage, bombings, assassinations, and executions. The word ”terrorism” carries some baggage, but it’s the term Marighella used and is an apt description for his use of political violent to disrupt the daily operations of the state.

English translations of *The Mini Manual* made its way to the United States in the Summer of 1970. The translation featured in this zine was published over the course of several months by *The Berkeley Tribe*, a countercultural newspaper out of Berkeley, CA operating from 1969-1972. *The Berkeley Tribe* credits the Black Panther Party as their source for the Mini Manual’s translation. A few other organizations published the manual simultaneously, including *Red Earth*, a newspaper affiliated with The Weather Underground organization (one of America’s very own urban guerilla organizations during the 70’s).

This zine is a reproduction of the original articles that ran in *The Berkeley tribe*. Only parts 1-7 are original, the remainder of *The Mini Manual of the Urban Guerilla* was added in with backgrounds from other articles featured in *The Berkeley Tribe* in order complete the text.

the wounded stay cannot be known to anyone but the small group of comrades responsible for their care and transport. Sheets, bloody clothing, medicine and any other indications of treatment of comrades wounded in combat must be completely eliminated from any place they visit to receive treatment.

Guerrilla Security

The urban guerrilla lives in constant danger of the possibility of being discovered or denounced. The primary security problem is to make certain that we are well-hidden and well guarded, and that there are secure methods to keep the police from locating us. The worst enemy of the urban guerrilla, and the major danger that we run into, is infiltration into our organization by a spy or informer. The spy trapped within the organization will be punished with death. The same goes for those who desert and inform to the police. A well-laid security means there are no spies or agents infiltrated into our midst, and the enemy can receive no information about us even through indirect means. The fundamental way to insure this is to be strict and cautious in recruiting. Nor is it permissible for everyone to know everything and everyone. This rule is a fundamental ABC of urban guerrilla security. The enemy wants to annihilate us and fights relentlessly to find us and destroy us, so our greatest weapon lies in hiding from him and attacking by surprise. The danger to the urban guerrilla is that he may reveal himself through carelessness or allow himself to be discovered through a lack of vigilance. It is impermissible for the urban guerrilla to give out his own or any other clandestine address to the police, or to talk too much. Notations in the margins of newspapers, lost documents, calling cards, letters or notes, all these are evidence that the police never underestimate. Address and telephone books must be destroyed, and one must not write or hold any documents. It is necessary to avoid keeping archives of legal or illegal names, biographical information,

cannot be perfect. One of the means we should use to diminish the possibility of error is to know thoroughly the seven deadly sins of the urban guerrilla and try to avoid them.

The first sin of the guerrilla is inexperience. The urban guerrilla, blinded by this sin, thinks the enemy is stupid, underestimates the enemy’s intelligence, thinks everything is easy and, as a result, leaves evidence that can lead to disaster. Because of his inexperience, the urban guerrilla may also overestimate the forces of the enemy, believing them to be stronger than they really are. Allowing himself to be fooled by this presumption, the urban guerrilla becomes intimidated and remains insecure and indecisive, paralyzed and lacking in audacity. The second sin of the urban guerrilla is to boast about the actions he has undertaken and to broadcast them to the four winds. The third sin of the urban guerrilla is vanity. The guerrilla who suffers from this sin tries to solve the problems of the revolution by actions in the city, but without bothering about the beginnings and survival of other guerrillas in other areas. Blinded by success, he winds up organizing an action that he considers decisive and that puts into play the entire resources of the organization. Since we cannot afford to break the guerrilla struggle in the cities while rural guerrilla warfare has not yet erupted, we always run the risk of allowing the enemy to attack us with decisive blows. The fourth sin of the urban guerrilla is to exaggerate his strength and to undertake actions for which he, as yet, lacks sufficient forces and the required infrastructure.

The fifth sin of the urban guerrilla is rash action. The guerrilla who commits this sin loses patience, suffers an attack of nerves, does not wait for anything, and impetuously throws himself into action, suffering untold defeats. The sixth sin of the urban guerrilla is to attack the enemy when they are most angry. The seventh sin of the urban guerrilla is to fail to plan things, and to

collection system and to obstruct its financial activities, throwing all the weight of armed action against it.

The urban guerrilla fights not only to upset the tax collection system—the weapon of armed action must also be directed against those government agencies that raise prices and those who direct them as well as against the wealthiest of the national and foreign profiteers and the important property owners. In short, against all those who accumulate huge fortunes out of the high cost of living, the wages of hunger, excessive prices and high rents. Foreign industries, such as refrigeration and other North American plants that monopolize the market and the manufacture of general food supplies, must be systematically attacked by the urban guerrillas. The rebellion of the urban guerrilla and his persistence in intervening in political questions is the best way of insuring popular support for the cause which we defend. We repeat and insist on repeating—it is the way of insuring popular support. As soon as a reasonable portion of the population begins to take seriously the actions of the urban guerrilla, his success is guaranteed.

The government has no alternative except to intensify its repression. The police networks, house searches, the arrest of suspects and innocent persons, and the closing off of streets make life in the city unbearable. The military dictatorship embarks on massive political persecution. Political assassinations and police terror become routine. In spite of all this, the police systematically fail. The armed forces, the navy and the air force are mobilized to undertake routine police functions, but even so they can find no way to halt guerrilla operations or to wipe out the revolutionary organization, with its fragmented groups that move around and operate throughout the country. The people refuse to collaborate with the government, and the general sentiment is that this government is

scenes begging the hangmen for elections, “re-democratization”, constitutional reforms, and other tripe designed to fool the people and make them stop the rebellion.

But, watching the guerrillas, the people now understand that it is a farce to vote in any elections which have as their sole objective guaranteeing the survival of the dictatorship and covering up its crimes. Attacking wholeheartedly this election farce and the so-called “political solution”, which is so appealing to the opportunists, the urban guerrillas must become even more aggressive and active, resorting without pause to sabotage, terrorism, expropriations, assaults, kidnappings, executions, etc. This action answers any attempt to fool the people with the opening of Congress and the reorganization of political parties—parties of the government and of the positions which the government allows—when all the time parliament and the so-called “parties” only function thanks to the permission of the military dictatorship, in a true spectacle of puppets or dogs on a leash.

The role of the urban guerrilla, in order to win the support of the population, is to continue fighting, keeping in mind the interests of the people and heightening the disastrous situation within which the government must act. These are the conditions, harmful to the dictatorship, which permit the guerrillas to open rural warfare in the middle of an uncontrollable urban rebellion.

The urban guerrilla is engaged in revolutionary action for the people, and with them seeks the participation of the people in the struggle against the dictatorship and the liberation of the country. Beginning with the city and the support of the people, the rural guerrilla war develops rapidly, establishing its infrastructure carefully while the urban area continues the rebellion.

GUERRILLA WARFARE

Rescue of the Wounded

The problem of the wounded in urban guerrilla warfare merits special attention. During guerrilla operations in the urban area, it may happen that some comrade is wounded by the police. When a guerrilla in the firing group has a knowledge of first aid, he can do something for the wounded comrade on the spot. Under no circumstances should the wounded guerrilla be abandoned at the site of the battle or left in the enemy's hands. One of the precautions we must take is to set up first-aid courses for men and women, courses in which guerrillas can learn the rudiments of emergency medicine. The urban guerrilla who is a doctor, nurse, med student, pharmacist or who simply has had first aid training is a necessity in modern guerrilla struggle. A small manual of first aid for urban guerrillas, printed on mimeographed sheets, can also be produced by anyone who has enough knowledge.

In planning and carrying out an armed action, the urban guerrilla cannot forget the organization of medical support. This must be accomplished by means of a mobile or motorized clinic. You can also set up a mobile first aid station. Another solution is to utilize the skills of a medical comrade, who waits with his bag of equipment in a designated house to which the wounded are brought. The ideal would be to have our own well-equipped clinic, but this is very expensive unless we expropriate all of our materials.

When all else fails, it is often necessary to resort to legal clinics, using armed force if necessary to force a doctor to treat our wounded. In the eventuality that we fall back upon blood banks to purchase blood or plasma, we must not use legal addresses and certainly no addresses where the wounded can really be found, since they are under our care and protection. Nor should we supply the addresses of those involved in the guerrilla organization to the hospitals and health care clinics where we may take them. Such caution is indispensable to covering our tracks. The houses in which

maps or plans. Contact numbers should not be written down, but simply committed to memory. The urban guerrilla who violates these rules must be warned by the first one who notes this infraction and, if he repeats it, we must avoid working with him in the future. The urban guerrilla's need to move about constantly with the police nearby—given the fact that the police net surrounds the city—forces him to adopt various security precautions depending upon the enemy's movements. For this reason, it is necessary to maintain a daily information service about what the enemy appears to be doing, where the police net is operating and what points are being watched. The daily reading of the police news in the newspapers is a fountain of information in these cases. The most important lesson for guerrilla security is never, under any circumstances, to permit the slightest laxity in the maintenance of security measures and precautions within the organization.

Guerrilla security must also be maintained in the case of an arrest. The arrested guerrilla must reveal nothing to the police that will jeopardize the organization. He must say nothing that will lead, as a consequence, to the arrest of other comrades, the discovery of addresses or hiding places, or the loss of weapons and ammunition.

The Seven Sins of the Urban Guerilla

Even when the urban guerrilla applies proper tactics and abides by its security rules, he can still be vulnerable to errors. There is no perfect urban guerrilla. The most he can do is make every effort to diminish the margin of error, since he



act spontaneously.

Popular Support

One of the permanent concerns of the urban guerrilla is his identification with popular causes to win public support. Where government actions become inept and corrupt, the urban guerrilla should not hesitate to step in and show that he opposes the government, and thus gain popular sympathy. The present government, for example, imposes heavy financial burdens and excessively high taxes on the people. It is up to the urban guerrilla to attack the dictatorship's tax

unjust, incapable of solving problems, and that it resorts simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents. The political situation in the country is transformed into a military situation in which the "gorillas" appear more and more to be the ones responsible for violence, while the lives of the people grow worse.

When they see the military and the dictatorship on the brink of the abyss, and fearing the consequences of a civil war which is already well underway, the pacifiers (always to be found within the ruling elite) and the opportunists (partisans of nonviolent struggle) join hands and circulate rumors behind the



THE URBAN GUERRILLA THEORY OF REVOLUTION





Chart of the two-pronged approach used by the urban guerilla, as seen in the FBI counter-terrorism essay *The Legacy of Carlos Marighella*.



Mugshot of Carlos Marighella from 1939. As a sidenote, some sources call him a "known seducer."

Marighella: an Introduction

On the night of November 4, 1969, four secret agents followed a man into a back alley of Rio de Janeiro and shot him to death. The man's name was Carlos Marighella; at the time of his assassination he was the leading revolutionary figure in the Brazilian struggle.

There was a rhythm to Marighella's life as there is a rhythm in the lives of all great revolutionaries. For Marighella that rhythm began in the slums of Salvador, began in childhood, in the shock, the

trauma, of growing up in the shadow of the expansion of American imperialism in Brazil. It is a life that is inseparable in its varied strands from the struggle. It is a part of, it evolves, expands, and contracts with and through the struggle.

He was born in 1911 in northeast Brazil, the son of an Italian immigrant, the descendant of African slaves.

At the age of 18, he joined the Brazilian Communist Party. He became instrumental in tightening the Party.

Twice he was arrested, twice he was amnestied.

In 1948 the Party was outlawed and Marighella began his life in the underground. Now, understand a certain charm the man had, a way of speaking directly, beautifully to people. Carlos Marighella sacrificed that gift because it was a revolutionary necessity. That was his other gift. His total commitment to the struggle of his people.

By 1967, he had become convinced of the need for more direct revolutionary

action; he resigned from the Communist Party.

Carlos Marighella introduced a new form of revolutionary struggle in Brazil. His **MINI-MANUAL FOR THE URBAN GUERRILLA** is the most concise complete document written to date on urban guerrilla warfare. While Marighella's concepts grow directly out of the Brazilian struggle, the general points he makes are relevant to the struggle of all revolutionaries — the struggle of all urban guerrillas — the one struggle being waged everywhere against the same enemy.

MARIGHELLA LIVES

Personal Qualities if the Urban Guerrilla

The urban guerrilla is characterized by his bravery and decisive nature. He must be a good tactician and a good shot. The urban guerrilla must be a person of great astuteness to compensate for the fact that he is not sufficiently strong in arms, ammunition, and equipment.

The urban guerrilla's arms are inferior to the enemy's, but from a moral point of view, the urban guerrilla has an undeniable superiority.

The moral superiority is what sustains the urban guerrilla. Thanks to it, the urban guerrilla can accomplish his principal duty, which is to attack and to survive.

The urban guerrilla must possess initiative, mobility, and flexibility, as well as versatility and a command of any situation. Initiative especially is an indispensable quality. It is not always possible to foresee everything, and the urban guerrilla cannot let himself become confused, or wait for orders. His duty is to act, to find adequate solutions for each problem he faces, and not to retreat. It is better to err in acting than to do nothing for fear of erring. Without initiative there is no urban guerrilla warfare.

Other important qualities in the urban guerrilla are the following: to be a good walker, to be able to stand up against fatigue, hunger, rain, heat. To know how to hide and to be vigilant. To conquer the art of dissembling. Never to fear danger. To behave the same by day as by night. Not to act impetuously. To have unlimited patience. To remain calm and cool in the worst conditions and situations. Never to leave a trail or track. Not to get discouraged.

as experience teaches us every day. Common criminals commit errors frequently because of their tactics, and this is one of the reasons why the urban guerrillas must be so insistently preoccupied with following revolutionary tactics, and not the tactics of bandits. And not only for that reason. There is no urban guerrilla worthy of the name who ignores the revolutionary method of action and fails to practice it rigorously in the planning and execution of his activities.

Mechanization, in general, is an underestimated factor in the tactics of conducting an action. Frequently, mechanization is left to the end, on the eve of the action, before anything is done about it. This is a mistake. Mechanization must be seriously considered. It must be undertaken with considerable foresight and with careful planning, based on careful and precise information. The care, conservation, maintenance and camouflaging of stolen vehicles are very important details of mechanization. When transportation fails, the primary action fails, with serious material and morale problems for the urban guerrillas. The



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MINI MANUAL

on the false information fed to them.

2. Letting false plans fall into the hands of the police to divert their attention
3. Planting rumors to make the government uneasy
4. Exploiting by every means possible the corruption, the mistakes and the failures of the government and its representatives, forcing them into demoralizing explanations and justifications in the very communication media they wish to maintain under censorship
5. Presenting denunciations to foreign embassies, the United Nations, the papal nunciature, and the international commissions defending human rights or freedom of the press, exposing each concrete violation and each use of violence by the military dictatorship and making it known that the revolutionary war will continue with serious danger for the enemies of the population.

How to Carry Out the Action

The urban guerrilla who correctly carries through his apprenticeship and training must give the greatest possible importance to his method of carrying out actions, for in this he cannot commit the slightest error. Any carelessness in learning tactics and their use invites certain disaster,

"The giant is known by his toe." The same can be said of the urban guerrilla, who is known from afar by his correct tactics and his absolute fidelity to principle.

The revolutionary method of carrying out actions is strongly and forcefully based on the knowledge and use of the following elements;

1. Investigation and intelligence gathering
2. Observation and vigilance
3. Reconnaissance, or exploration of the terrain
4. Study and timing of routes
5. Mapping
6. Mechanization
7. Careful selection of personnel
8. Selection of firepower
9. Study and practice in success
10. Success
11. Use of cover
12. Retreat
13. Dispersal
14. The liberation or transfer of prisoners
15. The elimination of evidence
16. The rescue of wounded

Some Observations On Tactics

When there is no information, the point of departure for planning the action must be investigation, observation and vigilance. This method produces good results. In any event, even when there is information, it is essential to make observations to see that information is not at odds with observation or vice versa. Reconnaissance or exploration of the terrain and the study and timing of is to make a stab in the dark.

selection of personnel requires great care in order to avoid the inclusion of indecisive or wavering persons who present the danger of contaminating others, a danger that must be avoided.

The withdrawal is equally or more important than the operation itself, to the point that it must be rigorously planned including the possibility of defeat. One must avoid rescue or transfer of prisoners with children present, or anything to attract the attention of people passing through the area. The best thing is to

make the rescue appear as natural as possible, winding through different routes or narrow streets that scarcely permit passage on foot, in order to avoid an encounter between two cars.

The elimination of tracks is obligatory and demands the greatest caution—also in removing fingerprints and any other sign that could give the enemy information. Lack of care in the elimination of evidence is a factor that increases nervousness in our ranks, which the enemy often exploits.



How the Urban Guerrilla Lives and Subsists

The urban guerrilla must know how to live among the people and must be careful not to appear strange and separated from ordinary city life.

He should not wear clothes that are different from those that other people wear. Elaborate and high fashion clothing for men or women may often be a handicap if the urban guerrilla's mission takes him into working class neighborhoods or sections where such dress is uncommon. The same care has to be taken if the urban guerrilla moves from the South to the North or vice versa.

The urban guerrilla must live by his work or professional activity. If he is known and sought by the police, if he is convicted or is on parole, he must go underground and sometimes must live hidden. Under such circumstances, the urban guerrilla cannot reveal his activity to anyone, since that is always and only the responsibility of the revolutionary organization in which he is participating.

The urban guerrilla must have a great capacity for

observation, must be well informed about everything,

principally about the enemy's movements, and must be very searching and knowledgeable about the area in which he lives, operates, or through which he moves.

But the fundamental and decisive characteristic of the urban guerrilla is that he is a man who fights with arms; given this condition, there is very little likelihood that he will be able to follow his normal profession for long without being identified. The role of expropriation thus looms as clear as high noon. It is impossible for the urban guerrilla to exist and survive without fighting to expropriate.

Thus, within the framework of the class struggle, as it inevitably and necessarily sharpens, the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points toward two essential objectives:

a) the physical liquidation of the chiefs and assistants of the armed forces and of the police;

b) the expropriation of resources and those belonging to the big capitalists, latifundists, and imperialists, with small expropriations used for the maintenance of individual urban guerrillas and large ones for the sustenance of the revolution itself.

It is clear that the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla also has other objectives. But here we are referring to the two basic objectives, above all expropriation. It is necessary for every urban guerrilla to keep in mind always that he can only maintain his existence if he is disposed to kill the police and those dedicated to repression, and if he is determined- truly determined to expropriate the wealth of the big capitalists, the latifundists, and the imperialists.

Other useful forms of physical preparation are hiking, camping, and practice in survival in the woods, mountain climbing, rowing, swimming, skin diving, training as a frogman, fishing, harpooning, and the hunting of birds, small and big game.

It is very important to learn how to drive, pilot a plane, handle a motor boat and a sail boat, understand mechanics, radio, telephone, electricity, and have some knowledge of electronic techniques.

It is also very important to have a knowledge of topographical information, to be able to locate one's position by instruments or other available resources, to calculate distances, make maps and plans, draw to scale, make timings, work with an angle protractor, a compass, etc.

A knowledge of chemistry and of color combination, of stamp making, the domination of the technique of calligraphy and the copying of letters, and other skills are part of the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla, who is obliged to falsify documents in order to live within a society that he seeks to destroy.

In the area of auxiliary medicine he has the special role of being a doctor or understanding medicine, nursing, pharmacology, drugs, elemental surgery, and emergency first aid.

The basic question in the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla is nevertheless to know how to handle arms such as the machine gun, revolver, automatic, FAL, various types of shotguns, carbines, mortars, bazookas, etc.

A knowledge of various types of ammunition and explosives is another aspect to consider. Among the explosives, dynamite must be well understood. The use of incendiary bombs, of smoke bombs, and other types are indispensable prior knowledge.

To know how to make and repair arms, prepare Molotov cocktails, grenades, mines, homemade destructive devices, how to blow up bridges, tear up and put out of service rails and sleepers, these are requisites in the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla that can never be considered unimportant.

The highest level of preparation for the urban guerrilla is the center for technical training. But only the guerrilla who has already passed the preliminary examinations can go on to this school-that is to say, one who has passed the proof of fire in revolutionary action, in actual combat against the enemy.

Our thanks to the Black Panther Party for helping us get this information.

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Executions

Execution is the killing of a foreign spy, of an agent of the dictatorship, of a police torturer, of a dictatoral personality in the government involved in crimes and persecutions against patriots, of a stool pigeon, informer, police agent or police provocateur. Those who go to the police of their own free will to make denunciations and accusations, who supply information and who finger people, must be executed when they are caught by the urban guerrillas. Execution is a secret action, in which the least possible number of urban guerrillas are involved. In many cases, the execution can be carried out by a single sniper, patient, alone and unknown, and operating in absolute secrecy and in cold blood.

Kidnapping

Kidnapping is capturing and holding in a secret place a spy, political personality or a notorious and dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement. Kidnapping is used to exchange or liberate imprisoned revolutionaries or to force the suspension of torture in jail by the military dictatorship.

The kidnapping of personalities who are well-known artists, sports figures or who are outstanding in some other field, but who have evidenced no political interest, can be a useful form of propaganda for the guerrillas, provided it occurs under special circumstances, and is handled so the public understands and sympathizes with it. The kidnappings of foreigners or visitors constitutes a form of protest against the penetration and domination of imperialism in our country.

Sabotage

Sabotage is a highly destructive type of attack using very few persons—and sometimes requiring only one—to accomplish the desired result. When the urban guerrilla uses

sabotage. Then comes the step of dispersed and general sabotage, carried out by the population. Well-executed sabotage demands study, planning and careful action. A characteristic form of sabotage is explosion, using dynamite, fire or the placing of mines. A little sand, a trickle of any kind of combustible, a poor lubrication job, a screw removed, a short circuit, inserted pieces of wood or iron, can cause irreparable damage. The objective of sabotage is to hurt, to damage, to make useless and to destroy vital enemy points such as the following:

- 1. The economy of the country
- 2. Agricultural or industrial production
- 3. Transport and communication systems
- 4. Military and police systems and their establishments and depots
- 5. The repressive military-police system
- 6. The firms and properties of exploiters in the country

The urban guerrilla should endanger the economy of the country, particularly its economic and financial aspects, such as its domestic and foreign banking network, its exchange and credit systems, its tax collection system, etc.

Public offices, centers of government and government depots are easy targets for sabotage. Nor will it be easy to prevent the sabotage of agricultural and industrial production by the urban guerrilla, with his thorough knowledge of the local situation. Factory workers acting as urban guerrillas are excellent industrial saboteurs, since they, better than anyone, understand the industry, the factory, the machinery or the part most likely to destroy an entire operation, doing much more damage than a poorly-informed layman could do.

With respect to the enemy's transport and communications systems, beginning with railway traffic,

systematically with sabotage. The only caution is against causing death and injury to passengers, especially regular commuters on suburban and long-distance trains. Attacks on freight trains, rolling or stationary stock, stoppage of military transports and communications systems, these are the major objectives in this area. Sleepers can be damaged and pulled up, as can rails. A tunnel blocked by a barrier of explosives, or an obstruction caused by a derailed car, causes enormous harm.

The derailment of a train carrying fuel is of major damage to the enemy. So is dynamiting a railroad bridge. In a system where the size and weight of the rolling equipment is enormous, it takes months for workers to repair or rebuild the destruction and damage. As for highways, they can be obstructed with trees, stationary vehicles, ditches, dislocation of barriers by dynamite, and bridges destroyed by explosions. Ships can be damaged at anchor in seaports or riverports, or in the shipyards. Aircraft can be destroyed or damaged on the ground. Telephone and telegraph lines can be systematically damaged, their towers blown up, and their lines made useless.

Transport and communications must be sabotaged immediately because the revolutionary movement has already begun in Brazil, and it is essential to impede the enemy's movement of troops and munitions.

Oil lines, fuel plants, depots for bombs and ammunition arsenals, military camps and bases must become targets for sabotage operations, while vehicles, army trucks and other military or police vehicles must be destroyed wherever they are found. The military and police repression centers and their specialized organs must also claim the attention of the guerrilla saboteur. Foreign firms and

material for the mass communication system. Bank robberies, ambushes, desertions and the diverting of weapons, the rescue of prisoners, executions, kidnappings, sabotage, terrorism and the war of nerves are all cases in point.

Airplanes diverted in flight by guerrilla action, ships and trains assaulted and seized by armed guerrillas, can also be carried out solely for propaganda effect. But the urban guerrilla must never fail to install a clandestine press, and must be able to turn out mimeographed copies using alcohol or electric plates and other duplicating apparatus, expropriating what he cannot buy in order to produce small clandestine newspapers, pamphlets, flyers and stamps for propaganda and agitation against the dictatorship.

The urban guerrilla engaged in clandestine printing facilitates enormously the incorporation of large numbers of people into the struggle, by opening a permanent work front for those willing to carry on propaganda, even when to do so means to act alone and risk their lives.

With the existence of clandestine propaganda and agitational material, the inventive spirit of the urban guerrilla expands and creates catapaults, artifacts, mortars and other instruments with which to distribute the anti-government propaganda at a distance. Tape recordings, the occupation of radio stations, the use of loudspeakers, graffiti on walls and other inaccessible places are other forms of propaganda. A consistent propaganda by letters sent to specific addresses, explaining the meaning of the urban guerrilla's armed actions, produces considerable results and is one method of influencing certain segments of the population.

Even this influence—exercised in

at long range, and his arms are appropriate for either type of shooting.

The Firing Group

In order to function, the urban guerilla must be organized in small groups. A group of do more than four or five is called *the firing group*.

A minimum of two firing groups, separated and sealed off from the other firing groups, directed and coordinated by one or two people, this is what makes a *firing team*.

Within the firing group there must be complete confidence among the comrades. The best shot and the one who knows best how to manage the machine gun is the person in charge of operations. The firing group plans and executes urban guerrilla actions, obtains and guards arms, studies and corrects its own tactics.

When there are tasks planned by the strategic command, these tasks take preference. But there is no such thing as a firing group without its initiative. For this reason it is essential to avoid any rigidity in the organization in order to permit the greatest possible initiative on the part of the firing group. The old-type hierarchy, the style of the traditional left doesn't exist in our organization.

This means that, except for the priority of objectives set by the strategic command, any firing group can decide to assault a bank, to kidnap or to execute an (agent of the dictatorship, a figure identified with the reaction, or a North American spy, and can carry out any kind of propaganda or war of nerves against the enemy without the need to consult the general command.

MINI

Work in metallurgy and on the mechanical lathe are basic skills the urban guerrilla should incorporate into industrial planning, which is the construction of homemade weapons.

This construction and courses in explosives and sabotage must be organized. The primary materials for practice in these courses must be obtained ahead of time prevent an incomplete apprenticeship—that is to say, so as to leave no room for experimentation.

Molotov cocktails, gasoline, homemade contrivances such as catapults and mortars for firing explosives, grenades made of tubes and cans, smoke bombs, mines, conventional explosives such as dynamite and potassium chloride, plastic explosives, gelatin capsules, ammunition of every kind are indispensable to the success of the urban guerrilla's mission.

The method of obtaining the necessary materials and munitions will be to buy them or take them by force in expropriation actions especially planned and carried out. The urban guerrilla will be careful not to keep explosives and materials that can cause accidents around for very long, but will try always to use them immediately on their destined targets.

The urban guerilla's arms and his ability to maintain them constitute his fire power. By his taking advantage of modern arms and introducing innovations in his fire power and in the use of certain arms, the urban guerrilla can change many of the tacts of city warfare. An example of this was the innovation made by the urban guerrillas in Brazil when they introduced the machine gun in their attacks on banks.

When the massive use of uniform machine guns becomes possible, there will be new changes in urban guerrilla warfare tactics. The firing group that utilizes uniform weapons and corresponding ammunition, will with reasonable support for their maintenance, will reach a considerable level of efficiency. The urban guerrilla increases his efficiency as he improves his firing potential.

MANUAL

The Urban Guerrilla's Arms

The urban guerrilla's arms are light arms, easily exchanged, usually captured from the enemy.

Light arms have, the advantage of fast handling and easy transport. In general, light arms are characterized as short barreled. This includes many automatic arms.

Automatic and semiautomatic arms

considerably increase the fighting power of the urban guerrilla. The disadvantage of this type of arm for us is the difficulty in controlling it, resulting in wasted rounds or in a prodigious use of ammunition, compensated for only by optimal aim and firing precision, Men who are poorly trained convert automatic weapons into an ammunition drain.

Experience as shown that the basic arm of the urban guerrilla is the light machine gun. This arm, in addition to being efficient and easy to shoot in an urban area, has the advantage of being greatly respected by the enemy. The guerrilla must know thoroughly how to handle the machine gun, now so popular and indispensable to Brazilian urban guerrilla.

The ideal machine gun for the urban guerrilla is the lna 45 caliber. Other types of machine guns of different calibers can be used—understanding of course, the problem of ammunition. Thus it is preferable that the industrial potential of the urban guerrilla permit the production of a single machine gun so that the ammunition used can be standardized.


Each firing group of urban guerrillas must have a machine gun managed by a good marksman. The other components of the group must be armed with .38 revolvers, our standard arm. The .32 is also useful for those who want to participate. But the .38 is preferable since its impact usually puts the enemy out of action.

Hand grenades and conventional smoke bombs can be considered light arms, with defensive power for cover and withdrawal.

Long barrel arms are more difficult for the urban guerrilla to transport and attract much attention because of their size. Among the long barrel arms are the FAL, the Mauser guns or rifles, hunting guns such as the Winchester, and others.

Shotguns can be useful if used at close range and point blank. They are useful even for a poor shot, especially at night when the precision isn't much help. A pressure airgun can be useful for training in marksmanship. Bazookas and mortars can also be used in action but the conditions for using them have to be prepared and the people who use them must be trained.

URBAN PT. 3 GUERRILLA



Mobility and Speed

To insure a mobility and speed that the police cannot match, the urban guerrilla needs the following prerequisites:

- a) mechanization;
- b) knowledge of the terrain;
- c) a rupture or suspension of enemy communications and transport;
- d) light arms.

By carefully carrying through operations that last only a few moments, and leaving the site in mechanized vehicles, the urban guerrilla beats a rapid retreat, escaping persecution.

The urban guerrilla must know the way in detail and, in this sense, must go through the schedule ahead of time as a training to avoid entering alleyways that have no exit, or running into traffic jams, or becoming paralyzed by the Transit Department's traffic signals.

BofA

Characteristics of the Urban Guerrilla's Technique

The technique of the urban guerrilla has the following characteristics:

- a) It is an aggressive technique, or in other words, it has an offensive character. As is well known, defensive

When there is no possibility of deserting and taking arms and ammunition, the military urban guerrilla must engage in sabotage, starting explosions and fires in munitions and gunpowder.

This technique of deserting with arms and ammunition, of raiding and sabotaging the military centres, is the best way of wearing out and demoralizing the gorillas and of leaving them confused.

The urban guerrilla's purpose in disarming an individual enemy is to capture his arms. These arms are usually in the hands of sentinels or others whose task is guard duty or repression.

The capture of arms may be accomplished by violent means or by astuteness and by tricks or traps. When the enemy is disarmed, he must be searched for arms other than those already taken from him. If we are careless, he can use the arms that were not seized to shoot the urban guerrilla.

The seizure of arms is an efficient method of acquiring machine guns, the urban guerrilla's most important arms.

When we carry out small operations or actions to seize arms and ammunition, the material captured may be for personal use or for armaments and supplies for the firing groups.

In a bank assault, we must be careful to seize the arm or arms of the bank guard. The remainder of the arms we find with the treasurer, the bank teller, or the manager must also be seized ahead of time.

The other method we can use to capture arms is the preparation of ambushes against the police and the cars they use to move around in.

Quite often we succeed in capturing arms in the police commissaries as a result of raids from outside.

The expropriation of arms, ammunition, and explosives is the urban guerrilla's goal in assaulting commercial houses, industries, and quarries.

The guerrilla operations that can be used in liberating prisoners are the following:

- a) riots in penal establishments, in correctional colonies and islands, or on transport or prison ships;
- b) assaults on urban or rural penitentiaries, houses of detention, commissaries, prisoner depots, or any other permanent, occasional, or temporary place where prisoners are held;
- c) assaults on prisoner transport trains and cars;
- d) raids and penetrations of prisons;
- e) ambushing of guards who are moving prisoners.

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DESERTIONS, DIVERSIONS, SEIZURES, EXPROPRIATIONS OF ARMS, AMMUNITION, EXPLOSIVES

Desertion and the diversion of arms are actions effected in military camps, ships, military hospitals, etc. The urban guerrilla soldier, chief, sergeant, subofficial, and official must desert at the most opportune moment with modern arms and ammunition to hand them over for the use of the revolution.

One of the opportune moments is when the military urban guerrilla is called upon to pursue and to fight his guerrilla comrades outside the military quarters. Instead of following the orders of the gorillas, the military urban guerrilla must join the revolutionaries by handing over the arms and ammunition he carries, or the military plane he pilots.

The advantage of this method is that the revolutionaries receive arms and ammunition from the army, the navy, and the air force, the military police, the civilian guard, or the firemen without any great work, since it reaches their hands by government transport.

Other opportunities may occur in the barracks, and the military urban guerrilla must always be alert to this. In case of carelessness on the part of the commanders or in other favorable conditions, such as bureaucratic attitudes and behavior or relaxation of discipline on the part of sublieutenants and other internal personnel, the military urban guerrilla must no longer wait but must try to advise the organizations and desert alone or accompanied, but with as large a supply of arms as possible.

With information from and participation of the military urban guerrilla, raids on barracks and other military establishments for the purpose of capturing arms can be organized.

The police pursue the urban guerrilla blindly without knowing which road he is using for his escape.

While the urban guerrilla quickly flees because he knows the terrain, the police lose the trail and give up the chase.

The urban guerrilla must launch his operations far from the logistics base of the police. An initial advantage of this method of operation is that it places us at a reasonable distance from the possibility of persecution, which facilitates the evasion.


In addition, to this necessary precaution, the urban guerrilla must be concerned with the enemy's communication system. The telephone is the primary target in preventing the enemy from access to information by knocking out his communication system.

Even if he knows about the guerrilla operation, the enemy depends on modern transport for his logistics support, and his vehicles necessarily lose time carrying him through the heavy traffic of the large cities.

It is clear that the tangled and treacherous traffic is a disadvantage for the enemy, as it would be for us if we were not ahead of him.

If we want to have a safe margin of security and be certain to leave no tracks for the future, we can adopt the following methods:

- purposely intercept the police with other vehicles or by apparently casual inconveniences and damages; but in this case the vehicles in question should not be legal nor should they have real license numbers.
- obstruct the road with fallen trees, rocks, ditches, false traffic signs, dead ends or detours, and other ingenious methods;
- place homemade mines in the way of the police, use gasoline, or throw Molotov cocktails to set their vehicles on fire;
- set off a burst of machine gun fire or arms such as the FAL aimed at the motor and the tires of the cars engaged in pursuit.



mini

7

The necessity to provide firing power for the urban guerrilla is so great that, in order to take off from zero point we often have to purchase one weapon, divert or capture a single arm. The basic point is to begin, and to begin with a great spirit of decisiveness and of boldness. The possession of a single arm multiplies our forces.

LIBERATION OF PRISONERS

The liberation of prisoners is an armed operation designed to free the jailed urban guerrilla. In daily struggle against the enemy, the urban guerrilla is subject to arrest and can be sentenced to unlimited years in jail. This does not mean that the revolutionary battle stops here. For the guerrilla, his experience is deepened by prison and continues even in the dungeons where he is held.

The imprisoned urban guerrilla views jail as a terrain he must dominate and understand in order to free himself by a guerrilla operation. There is no prison, either on an island, in a city penitentiary, or on a farm that is impregnable to the slyness, the cleverness, and the firing potential of the revolutionaries.

The urban guerrilla who is free views the penal establishments of the enemy as the inevitable site of guerrilla action designed to liberate his ideological brothers from prison.

It is this combination of the urban guerrilla in freedom and the urban guerrilla in jail that results in the armed operations we refer to as the liberation of prisoners.

With the arrogance typical of the police and the military fascist authorities, the enemy will come to fight us with heavy guns and equipment and with elaborate maneuvers by men armed to the teeth. The urban guerrilla must respond to this with light weapons easily transported, so he can always escape with maximum speed, without ever accepting open fighting. The urban guerrilla has no mission other than to attack and retreat.

Knowledge of the Terrain

The urban guerrilla's best ally is the terrain and because this is so he must know it like the palm of his hand.

To have the terrain as an ally means to know how to use with intelligence its unevenness, its high and its low points, its turns, its irregularities, its regular and its secret passages, abandoned areas, its thickets, etc., taking maximum advantage of all this for the success of armed actions, escapes, retreats, cover, and hiding places.

Its impasses and narrow spots, its gorges, its streets under repair, police control points, military zones and closed off streets, the entrances and exits of tunnels and those that the enemy can close off, viaducts to be crossed, corners controlled by the police or watched, its lights and signals, all this must be thoroughly known and studied in order to avoid fatal errors.

Our problem is to get through and to know where and how to hide, leaving the enemy bewildered in areas he doesn't know.

Familiar with the avenues, streets, alleys, ins and outs, and corners of the urban centers, its paths and shortcuts, its empty lots, its underground passages, its pipes and sewer system, the urban guerrilla safely crosses through the irregular and difficult terrain unfamiliar to the police, where they can be surprised in a fatal ambush or trapped at any moment.

Because he knows the terrain the guerrilla can go through it on foot, on bicycle, in automobile, jeep, or truck, and never be trapped. Acting in small groups with only a few people, the guerrillas can reunite at an hour and place determined beforehand, following up the attack with new guerrilla operations, or evading the police circle and disorienting the enemy with their unprecedented audacity.

It is an insoluble problem for the police in the labyrinthian terrain of the urban guerrilla, to get someone they can't see to repress someone they can't catch, to close in on someone they can't find.

Our experience is that the ideal urban guerrilla is one who operates in his own city and knows thoroughly its streets, its neighborhoods, its transit problems, and other peculiarities.

The guerrilla outsider, who comes to a city whose corners are unfamiliar to him, is a weak spot and if he is assigned certain operations, can endanger them. To avoid grave errors, it is necessary for him to get to know well the layout of the streets.

Surprise

To compensate for his general weakness and shortage of arms compared to the enemy, the urban guerrilla uses surprise. The enemy has no way to fight surprise and becomes confused or is destroyed.

When urban guerrilla warfare broke out in Brazil, experience proved that surprise was essential to the success of any urban guerrilla operation.

The technique of surprise is based on four essential requisites:

- we know the situation of the enemy we are going to attack, usually by means of precise information and meticulous observation, while the enemy does not know he is going to be attacked and knows nothing about the attacker;
- we know the force of the enemy that is going to be attacked and the enemy knows nothing about our force;
- attacking by surprise, we save and conserve our forces, while the enemy is unable to do the same and is left at the mercy of events;
- we determine the hour and the place of the attack, fix its duration, and establish its objective. The enemy remains ignorant of all this.

action means death for us. Since we are inferior to the enemy in fire power and have neither his resources nor his power force, we cannot defend ourselves against an offensive or a concentrated attack by the gorillas. And that is the reason why our urban technique can never be permanent, can never defend a fixed base nor remain in any one spot waiting to repel the circle of reaction;

b) it is a technique of attack and retreat by which we preserve our forces;

c) it is a technique that aims at the development of urban guerrilla warfare, whose function will be to wear out, demoralize, and distract the enemy forces.

The Initial Advantages of the Urban Guerrilla

The dynamics of urban guerrilla warfare lie in the urban guerrilla's violent clash with the military and police forces of the dictatorship. In this clash, the police have the superiority. The urban guerrilla has inferior forces. The paradox is that the urban guerrilla, although weaker, is nevertheless the attacker.

The military and police forces, for their part, respond to the attack by mobilizing and concentrating infinitely superior forces in the persecution and destruction of the urban guerrilla. He can only avoid defeat if he counts on the initial advantages he has and knows how to exploit them to the end to compensate for his weaknesses and lack of materiel.

The initial advantages are:

- he must take the enemy by surprise;
- he must know the terrain of the encounter better than the enemy;
- he must have greater mobility and speed than the police and the other repressive forces;
- his information service must be better than the enemy's;
- he must be in command of the situation and demonstrate a decisiveness so great that everyone on our side is inspired and never thinks of hesitating, while on the other side the enemy is stunned and incapable of responding.

INFORMATION

The possibilities that the government has for discovering and destroying the urban guerrillas lessen as the potential of the dictatorship's enemies becomes greater and more concentrated among the popular masses.

This concentration of opponents of the dictatorship plays a very important role in providing information as it moves on the part of the police and men in government, as well as hiding our activities. The enemy can also be thrown off by false information, which is worse for him because it is a tremendous waste.

By whatever means, the sources of information at the disposal of the urban guerrilla are potentially better than those of the police. The enemy is observed by the people, but he does not know who among the people transmits information to the urban guerrilla. The military and the police are hated for the injustices and violence they commit against the people, and this facilitates obtaining information prejudicial to the activities of government agents.

The information, which is only a small area of popular support, represents an extraordinary potential in the hands of the urban guerrilla. The creation of an intelligence service with an organized structure is a basic need for us. The urban guerrilla has to have essential information about the plans and movements of the enemy, where they are, and how they move, the resources of the banking network, the means of communication, and the secret moves the enemy makes.

The trustworthy information passed along to the urban guerrilla represents a well-aimed blow at the dictatorship. It has no way to defend itself in the face of an important leak that jeopardizes its interests and facilitates our destructive attack.

By the same token it is important to know how to respond to the police net. When the police designate certain of their men to go into the masses to arrest a demonstrator, a larger group of urban guerrillas must surround the police group, disarming and beating them and at the same time letting the prisoner escape. This urban guerrilla operation is called the *net within the net*.

When the police net is formed at a school building, a factory, a place where the masses assemble, or some other point, the urban guerrilla must not give up or allow himself to be taken by surprise. To make his net work the enemy is obliged to transport the police in vehicles and special cars to occupy strategic points in the streets in order to invade the building or chosen locale. The urban guerrilla, for his part, must never clear a building or an area and meet in it without first knowing its exits, the way to break the circle, the strategic points that the police might occupy, and the roads that inevitably lead into the net, and he must hold other strategic points from which to strike at the enemy.



You remember the Fugs.

The band that ran yodeling into the Abyss carrying the lamp of freedom and dragging behind them their latest album of happiness, humor and creep-grovel

GOLDEN FILM

On Reprise, where cackling record executives violate the high school yearbook picture of Pat Nixon.

In the past few weeks, the Tribe's been serializing Carlos Marighella's *Mini-Manual for the Urban Guerrilla*. To make the *mini-manual* better understood and more applicable to the Mother Country, we've decided to document some recent actions of various urban guerrilla groups in Latin America.

By reading about the actions of the Tupamaros in Uruguay and the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard guerrilla group in Brazil, the theory Marighella laid out becomes more real, and less mystical. By understanding this, we begin to realize how that theory can also be applied to the developing urban struggle in this country, and how it works in practice.

mini manual

buildings, offices and rooms, operation centers, etc.

Observation, investigation, reconnaissance, and exploration of the terrain are also excellent sources of information. The urban guerrilla never goes anywhere absentmindedly and without revolutionary precaution, always on the lookout lest something occur.

Eyes and ears open, senses alert, his memory engraved with everything necessary, now or in the future, to the uninterrupted activity of the fighter.

Careful reading of the press with particular attention to the organs of mass communication, the investigation of accumulated data, the transmission of news and everything of note, a persistence in being informed and in informing others, all this makes up the intricate and immensely complicated question of information which gives the urban guerrilla a decisive advantage.

RIO DE JANEIRO

Amerikan ambassador Elbrick, was kidnapped by a small band of guerrillas, members of the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (PRV), while driving home in his chauffeured car. They held him ransom for 40 political prisoners who had been in prison for several years.

This was the last such guerrilla action before Carlos Marighella, who founded the PRV, was offed by the Brazilian pigs.

SÃO PAULO

In March, the Japanese consul in São Paulo was kidnapped by members of the PRV and held until five Brazilian political prisoners were released.

The Brazilian government rapidly complied with the guerrillas demands when they threatened to kill the consul if they did not so as to avoid a similar situation to the recent kidnapping in Guatemala that resulted in the death of the kidnapped ambassador.

MONTEVIDEO

Fifty Tupamaros - including men and women - armed and dressed in naval uniforms arrived at a naval training center before dawn and disarmed the two guards without firing a shot. Then they proceeded to rip off a truckload of ammunition.

They loaded about 700 firearms - 300 rifles and a large amount of ammunition - onto a navy truck and split. Later, the truck was found empty and abandoned in a Montevideo suburb.

Uruguay's been under a state of siege for the past year because of guerrilla actions and the Uruguayan pigs have been searching for Raul Sendic, the Tup's leader since 1963!!!

MONTEVIDEO

In Montevideo, where the FBI occupies an entire floor of the Pig Headquarters, there is a special division of the police especially designated to destroy the Tupamaros called the Uruguayan Police Intelligence Unit and Special Brigade. Their chief, Moran Charquero, was personally responsible for the torture of many Tup's and political prisoners.

In early April, the Tup's fired 35 bullets into Charquero's car and killed him as he was driving to work. Since last July, the Tup's have offed eight pigs.

BUENOS AIRES

Eight guerrillas, armed to the teeth with submachine guns and pistols expropriated \$143,000 from an armed truck. They held up two guards who were trying to deliver the bread to a branch of the state-owned telephone network.

GUATEMALA CITY

In Guatemala, guerrilla groups did two kidnappings inside of a few weeks in late March and early April: the first was the

West German ambassador, von Spretti. They held him for the release of political prisoners in Guatemala, but the Guatemalan government refused to meet their demands, so the ambassador was offed. The next week, they kidnapped a Guatemalan pig banker, Gabriel Bijuria Rico (means "rich" in spanish), and ransomed him for half a million dollars.

now

Street tactics have revealed a new type of urban guerrilla, the urban guerrilla who participates in mass demonstrations. This is the type we designate as the urban guerrilla demonstrator, who joins the ranks and participates in popular marches with specific and definite aims.

These aims consist in hurling stones and projectiles of every type, using gasoline to start fires, using the police as a target for their fire arms, capturing police arms, kidnapping agents of the enemy and provocateurs, shooting with careful aim at the henchmen torturers and the police chiefs who come in special cars with false plates in order not to attract attention.

The urban guerrilla demonstrator shows groups in the mass demonstration the flight route if that is necessary. He plants mines, throws Molotov cocktails, prepares ambushes and explosions.

The urban guerrilla demonstrator must also initiate the *net within the net*, going through government vehicles, official cars, and police vehicles before turning them over or setting them on fire, to see if any of them have money and arms.

* PREMIERE * S.F. FEMIME TROUPE

PRESENTS


A Melodrama, or Tragic Episode of

THE INDEPENDENT FEMALE

OR
A Man has His Pride!

A Play on Women's Liberation

Golden Gate Park free!
behind De Young Museum
July 4 & 5 at 2 p.m.



Place Brass Et Lino
845-2248
Friday-Bishop's Coffee House 9pm 1437 Harrison St Oakland
Sat & Sun - Titicut Follies 9pm
Tele & Haste 9pm Berkeley

Occupations

Occupations are a type of attack carried out when the urban guerrilla stations himself in specific establishments and locations for a temporary resistance against the enemy or for some propaganda purpose.

The occupation of factories and schools during strikes or at other times is a method of protest or of distracting the enemy's attention.

The occupation of radio stations is for propaganda purposes.

Occupation is a highly effective model for action but, in order to prevent losses and material damage to our ranks, it is always a good idea to count on the possibility of withdrawal. It must always be meticulously planned and carried out at the opportune moment.

Occupation always has a time limit and the faster it is completed, the better.

Ambush

Ambushes are attacks typified by surprise when the enemy is trapped across a road or when he makes a police net surrounding a house or an estate. A false message can bring the enemy to the spot where he falls into the trap.

The principal object of the ambush tactic is to capture enemy arms and punish him with death.

Ambushes to halt passenger trains, the object is to annihilate the enemy and seize his arms.

The urban guerrilla sniper is the kind of fighter especially suited for ambush because he can hide easily in the irregularities of the terrain, on the roofs and the tops of buildings and apartments under construction. From windows and dark places, he can take careful aim at his chosen target.

Ambush has devastating effects on the enemy, leaving him unnerved, insecure, and fearful.


Street Tactics

Street tactics are used to fight the enemy in the streets, utilizing the participation of the masses against him.

In 1968 the Brazilian students used excellent street tactics against police troops, such as marching down streets against traffic, utilizing slings and marbles as arms against the mounted police.

Other street tactics consist in constructing barricades; pulling up paving blocks and hurling them at the police; throwing bottles, bricks, paperweights, and other projectiles from the top of apartment and office buildings against the police; using buildings under construction for flight, for hiding, and for supporting surprise attacks.

It is equally necessary to know how to respond to enemy tactics. When the police troops come protected with helmets to defend themselves against flying objects, we have to divide ourselves into two teams: one to attack the enemy from the front, the other to attack him in the rear, withdrawing one as the other goes into action to prevent the first from becoming a target for projectiles hurled by the second.



The roads followed by the police vehicles must be mined at key points along the way and at forced stopping points. When the mines explode, the vehicles will fly into the air. The police will be caught in the trap and will suffer losses or will be victims of ambush. The net must be broken by escape routes unknown to the police. The rigorous planning of the retreat is the best way of frustrating any encircling effort on the part of the enemy.

When there is no possibility of a flight plan, the urban guerrilla must not hold meetings, assemblies, or do anything else since to do so will prevent him from breaking through the net the enemy will surely try to throw around him.

The enemy also wants to know what steps we are taking so he can destroy us or prevent us from acting. In this sense the danger of betrayal is present and the enemy encourages betrayal or infiltrates spies into the organization. The urban guerrilla's technique against this enemy tactic is to denounce publicly the traitors, spies, informers, and provocateurs.

Since our struggle takes place among the masses and depends on their sympathy—while the government has a bad reputation because of its brutality, corruption, and incompetence—the informers, spies, traitors, and the police come to be enemies of the people without supporters, denounced to the urban guerrillas, and, in many cases, properly punished.

For their part the urban guerrilla must not evade the duty—once he knows who the spy or informer is—of wiping him out physically. This is the correct method, approved by the people, and it minimizes considerably the incidence of infiltration or enemy spying.

For the complete success of the battle against spies and informers, it is essential to organize a counterespionage or counterintelligence service. Nevertheless, as far as information is concerned, it cannot all be reduced to a question of knowing the enemy's moves and avoiding the infiltration of spies. Information must be broad, it must embrace everything, including the most insignificant matters. There is a technique of obtaining information and the urban guerrilla must master it. Following this technique, information is obtained naturally, as a part of the life of the people.

The urban guerrilla, living in the midst of the people and moving about among them, must be attentive to all types of conversations and human relations, learning how to disguise his interest with great skill and judgement.

In places where people work, study, live, it is easy to collect all kinds of information on payments, business, plans of all types, points of view, opinions, people's state of mind, trips, interiors of

DECISION

It is not enough for the urban guerrilla to have in his favor surprise, speed, knowledge of the terrain, and information. He must also demonstrate his command of any situation and a capacity for decision without which all other advantages will prove useless.

It is impossible to carry out any action, however well planned, if the urban guerrilla turns out to be indecisive, uncertain, irresolute.

Even an action successfully begun can end in defeat if the command of the situation and the capacity for decision falter in the middle of the actual execution of the plan. When this command of the situation and a capacity for decision are absent, the void is filled with vacillation and terror. The enemy takes advantage of this failure and is able to liquidate us. The secret for the success of any operation, simple or complicated, easy or difficult, is to rely on determined men. Strictly speaking, there are no easy operations. All must be carried out with the same care exercised in the case of the most difficult, beginning with the choice of the human element, which means relying on leadership and capacity for decision in every test.

One can see ahead of time whether an action will be successful or not by the way its participants act during the preparatory period. Those who are behind, who fail to make designated contacts, are easily confused, forget things, fail to complete the basic elements of the work, possibly are indecisive men and can be a danger. It is better not to include them.

Decision means to put into practice the plan that has been devised with determination, with audacity, and with an absolute firmness. It takes only one person who vacillates to lose all.





mini- manual

5

GETTING TO BE WHO WE ARE

As the summer opens we are deep into the Mini-Manual. For people who follow it, who are into it, a suggestion. Cut out the pages from the back issues. Save them. Take them out now and then and study them (preferably when stoned). We of the Tribe understand that as white people we are not at the level of struggle Marighella runs down. But some of us in the mother country are moving there.

The summer promises to be long, hot, and heavy. The State is getting more upright, more repressive, every day. Those of us who refuse to be co-opted into the many forms and life-styles of the pig nation are already beginning to incorporate the forms of the future. We will need the knowledge Marighella accumulated out of a lifetime of struggle for our own survival.

Probably a key part of the manual is when Marighella talks about the different types of action that a group can take. They vary in terms of level, but people should keep in mind something Marighella said:

"Before any action, the urban guerilla must think of the methods and personnel at his disposal to carry out the action. Operations that demand technical preparation cannot be carried out by someone who lacks that technical skill."

In future issues of the Tribe, each type of action will be dealt with in some detail. Make the Mini-Manual a part of your "survival kit". Turn your friends on to it. Come together.

—The Hole in the Wall Gang

THE BANK ASSAULT AS POPULAR MODEL

The most popular assault model is the bank assault. In Brazil, the urban guerrilla has begun a type of organized assault on the banks as a guerrilla operation. Today this type of assault is widely used and has served as a sort of preliminary examination for the urban guerrilla in his apprenticeship for the techniques of revolutionary warfare.

Important innovations in the technique of assaulting banks have developed, guaranteeing flight, the withdrawal of money, and the anonymity of those involved. Among these innovations we cite shooting the tires of cars to prevent pursuit; locking people in the bank bathroom, making them sit on the floor; immobilizing the bank guards and removing their arms, forcing someone to open the coffer or the strong box; using disguises.

Attempts to install bank alarms, to use guards or electronic detection devices of US origin, prove fruitless when the assault is political and is carried out according to urban guerrilla warfare technique. This technique tries to utilize new resources to meet the enemy's tactical changes, has access to a fire power that is growing every day, becomes increasingly astute and audacious, and uses a larger number of revolutionaries every time; all to guarantee the success of operations planned down to the last detail.

The bank assault is a typical expropriation. But, as is true in any kind of armed expropriatory action, the revolutionary is handicapped by a two-fold competition:

- a) competition from the outlaw;
- b) competition from the right-wing counterrevolutionary.

This competition produces confusion, which is reflected in the people's uncertainty. It is up to the urban guerrilla to prevent this from happening, and to accomplish this he must use two methods:

- a) he must avoid the outlaw's technique, which is one of unnecessary violence and appropriation of goods and possessions belonging to the people;
- b) he must use the assault for propaganda purposes, at the very moment it is taking place, and later distribute material, leaflets, every possible means of explaining the objectives and the principles of the urban guerrilla as expropriator of the government, the ruling classes, and imperialism.

RAIDS AND PENETRATION

Raids and penetrations are quick attacks on establishments located in neighborhoods or even in the center of the city, such as small military units, commissaries, hospitals, to cause trouble, seize arms, punish and terrorize the enemy, take reprisal, or rescue wounded prisoners, or those hospitalized under police vigilance.

Raids and penetrations are also made on garages and depots to destroy vehicles and damage installations, especially if they are North American firms and property. When they take place on certain stretches of the highway or in certain distant neighborhoods, the raids can serve to force the enemy to move great numbers of troops, a totally useless effort since he will find nobody there to fight.

When they are carried out in certain houses, offices, archives, or public offices, their purpose is to capture or search for secret papers and documents with which to denounce involvements, compromises, and the corruption of men in government, their dirty deals and criminal transactions with the North Americans.

Raids and penetrations are most effective if they are carried out at night.

ASSAULTS

Assault is the armed attack which we make to expropriate funds, liberate prisoners, capture explosives, machine guns, and other types of arms and ammunition.

Assaults can take place in broad daylight or at night.

Daytime assaults are made when the objective cannot be achieved at any other hour, as for example, the transport of money by the banks, which is not done at night.

Night assault is usually the most advantageous to the urban guerrilla. The ideal is for all assaults to take place at night when conditions for a surprise attack are most favorable and the darkness facilitates flight and hides the identity of the participants. The urban guerrilla must prepare himself, nevertheless, to act under all conditions, daytime as well as nighttime.

The most vulnerable targets for assault are the following:

- a) credit establishments;
- b) commercial and industrial enterprises, including the production of arms and explosives;
- c) military establishments;
- d) commissaries and police stations;
- e) jails;
- f) government property;
- g) mass communication media;
- h) North American firms and properties;
- i) government vehicles, including military and police vehicles, trucks, armored vehicles, money carriers, trains, ships, and planes.

The assaults on establishments are of the same nature because in every case the property and buildings represent a fixed target.

Assaults on buildings are conceived as guerrilla operations, varied according to whether they are against banks, a commercial enterprise, industries, military camps, commissaries, prisons, radio stations, warehouses for imperialist firms, etc.

The assaults on vehicles — money-carriers, armored cars, trains, ships, airplanes — are of another nature since they are moving targets. The nature of the operations varies according to the situation and the possibility — that is, whether the target is stationary or moving.

Armored cars, including military cars, are not immune to mines. Obstructed roads, traps, ruses, interception of other vehicles, Molotov cocktails, shooting with heavy arms, are efficient methods of assaulting vehicles.

Heavy vehicles, grounded planes, anchored ships can be seized and their crews and guards overcome. Airplanes in flight can be diverted from the course by guerrilla action or by one person.

Ships and trains in movement can be assaulted or taken by guerrilla operations in order to capture the arms and munitions or to prevent troop displacement.

