



2011) that he became politically structured in Ohalei Keidar prison in the Neguev, then in Section 3 of Hadarim, where the leaders are collectively isolated. He was nineteen. He spent nine years behind bars for belonging to the PFLP and for being suspected of having planned the murder of rabbi Ovadia Yussef, leader of the Shas party:

“In Ohalei Keidar, classes [given by the parties] were intensified because many prisoners had already done fifteen to twenty years in prison. We had at least seven or eight classes a week. There, you learn to shift from the heart to the brain, you learn the laws of the struggle ... Then I was transferred to Hadarim, to section 3; I shared Ahmad Saadat and other leaders’ cell. They are extraordinary people; they are examples for us. And later, I spent two and a half years in Walid’s [Daka] cell in Gilboa. It was a really important experience for me. He taught me a lot about the way to write, to publish declarations, and so on.”



Glory to the Martyrs
Freedom to the Prisoners
Healing to the Wounded
Revolution Until Victory



The Palestinian Revolution has three predominant aims: self-determination and freedom from occupation, the right of return for refugees, and freedom for prisoners. Perhaps unique in the context of national liberation movements, the most concrete and immediate goal of both the military aims of armed struggle and also the popular aims of national and international mass movements is the liberation of prisoners. This is not only because of the ubiquity of imprisonment, as incarceration in occupied Palestine affects everyone (roughly 20% of Palestinians have been imprisoned by the Zionist occupation at one point) and the object of incarceration is likewise collective, the criminalization of any form of political, militant, associative, civic, or community commitment as a form of collective punishment of resistance and collective control and displacement of an occupied people. The primacy of the liberation of prisoners as a collective goal of the Palestinian resistance is also emergent from the unity of imprisonment as a place of political and militant development, training, and socialization — with all resistance factions represented in an Inside history of resistance and rebellion following and in turn leading the Outside.

Many Palestinian political prisoners and former prisoners view the national liberation movement and the prisoners movement as one and the same, and in each iteration of struggle — from the birth of the revolution in 1965, through various stages of occupation and national resistance, two Intifadas, the failure of Oslo and the capitulation of the PLO and Fatah, mass popular resistance committees, the Great March of Return, non-stop war, ceaseless colonial-fascist violence and attempts to fragment the unity of the resistance, and what may as well become the Final Intifada — demonstrates the essentially carceral nature of the national liberation movement, both in the sense of the universality of imprisonment as a weapon of warfare and occupation and also — since wherever there is occupation there is rebellion — in that even the most brutal forms of imprisonment can themselves become schools of revolt.

What follows is a history of militant political action Inside and Outside occupation prisons and more essentially in their interrelation as a major constitution of the continuing Palestinian revolution excerpted from *A History of Confinement in Palestine: The Prison Web* (2022) by ethnographer Stéphanie Latte Abdallah.

PhD in Section 5 of Meggido via mobile phone before a jury from An-Najah University in Nablus, while Nidal Rashid Sabri and Tariq Abdel Karim Fayad did the same from Ofer before lecturers from Birzeit and al-Quds for their Masters' dissertations. These clandestine practices made it possible to follow courses in Arabic, in a university of their choice, and a cheaper one, and to bypass the official suspension of university studies. Figures such as the General Secretary of the PFLP Ahmad Saadat, the intellectual Walid Daka, or the PFLP deputy Khalida Jarrar hold Masters' degrees. Walid Daka obtained his Master's in Political Sciences at the Open University of Tel Aviv during detention. Marwan Al-Barghouti, a deputy and member of the Fatah Central Committee and the Palestinian National Council, completed his Political Sciences PhD at the University of Cairo, where he was enrolled before his arrest. In addition to supervising students Inside, these graduates give classes validated by the Palestinian universities. Ahmad Saadat teaches a history class at al-Aqsa University in Gaza, Khalida Jarrar gave classes for the high-school diploma in 2015 and 2017 in Hasharon women's prison even though the exam was suspended, and taught a class on human rights.

Furthermore, since Oslo, and in addition to their internal and partisan elections, detainees have stood as candidates in the legislative and presidential elections in the Occupied Territories. These are clandestine practices of carceral citizenships beyond the walls and not an authorized exercise of citizenship, as is allowed for Israeli detainees, who can vote in parliamentary elections. In 2000–2001, following a same principle of differentiation on the one hand, and the imposition of the annexation of East Jerusalem on everyone on the other, Jerusalemite prisoners were offered the possibility of voting in Israeli legislative elections. This proposal was refused in a common political stance. A deputy at the time of his incarceration, Marwan Barghouti, was re-elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006 while in detention, then to Fatah's Central Committee in 2009 and 2016, just as Ahmad Saadat became a deputy Inside and was re-appointed Secretary General of the PFLP. These leaders are involved in political activity in detention, in the struggles against the prison service, and on the Outside, via the intermediary of their parties. They also assume public roles Outside as political and intellectual figures who regularly publish in the press and issue political communiqués. Even if the breakdown in generational transmission has marked this generation, for those doing time in prisons where long-term prisoners are held, or sharing their cell or wing with political leaders and intellectual figures, the time spent in prison remains a period of learning and intellectual and political formation, of exercising citizenship and militancy.

When he was released at the age of thirty-three in late September 2018 after over a year's administrative detention, Salah Hamouri, a Jerusalemite of French nationality, had already been held in detention four times. Since, he was again arrested and has been held in administrative detention since March 7, 2022 till present, first in Ofer and lately in Hadarim high-security prison. Out of its five time in prison, he has been held three times in administrative detention, with no charges. The first time in 2001, he was sixteen. He was violently interrogated at al-Moscobiyeh for two months, and was sentenced to six months for having put up posters of martyrs and was accused of belonging to the PFLP youth wing. This was before the siege of the towns and mass incarcerations that followed. At that time, minors—essentially from Jerusalem—were grouped together in Telmond prison (Hasharon) in a separate newly-built wing. There were seventy-five Hierosolymitans, two or three Palestinian citizens of Israel, and one or two Gaza inhabitants. A (not respected) agreement was made with Shabas for a few adult political detainees to be present in order to organize their prison life. Only thirteen- to sixteen-year-old youths were held there, the Israeli authorities considering until 2011 that the age of majority for Palestinians from the Territories was sixteen. It was chaos. “Nothing was organized, there was just an Arabic teacher who came once a week. We had no television, no radio because the prison was brand-new. Nothing had been prepared with the Sulta either for sending money [for commissary]. It was shambolic, there were fights, it was the rule of the jungle.” This experience contrasts with his following one in 2004, when, as having reached the age of majority, he was administratively held for five months in Ofer where life was highly organized both in terms of rules and daily schedules, and in terms of learning and partisan supervision, where classes and readings were prepared by the factions. They slept in eight twenty-four-person tents, each of which corresponded to a political party. But it was above all during his third detention (2005–

missions, they intervene when alerted by mobile phone calls signaling medical problems, or to meet a person's specific needs, or during periods of "oppression" by the special units, confrontations with the guards, or poor treatment. These calls add to the older means of communication between the prisons and between the Inside and Outside: including the entrance and release of detainees; lawyer and family visits; "al-Bosta," the name for journeys to court or between facilities in prison vans that stop at several places, and notably at Ramleh central prison, where detainees cross paths and can exchange; prison transfers, which have become incessant with the new management; but also, and for political information only, the sometimes coded kapsulat (little capsules that are swallowed), or books into which documents are slipped.

I was able to observe the frequency of these cellphone exchanges when I was with the brothers or mothers of prisoners who received, or were waiting for these calls; when an ex-detainee showed me the photos of his prison friends taken with a phone camera while serving time; when, in a café, where I was talking to an ex-prisoner, the person sitting next to us who had overheard our conversation told me he was chatting at that very moment with one of his friends in al-Naqab and offered to give me his number. Since the early 2000s, the Israeli Haaretz journalist Amira Hass was thus able to correspond with Mahmoud Safadi beyond the walls by letter, then phone, a correspondence that gave rise to a theater play. A group of detainees used a smartphone to post the photo of a particularly succulent meal at al-Naqab on Facebook in 2009, in which, faces beaming, they tucked into a chicken striking defiant poses and playing up the opulence and their ability to escape the prison situation. Its circulation on social media, then in the Israeli press, caused a storm and resulted in a wave of searches, the confiscation of phones, and a clampdown on trafficking that considerably limited the number of phones in prison in the years that followed. Since, their possession has become less uniform: there are only one or two per wing, or even none at all in some facilities like Hadarim, where in any case, the network signal is jammed making it impossible to call. The installation of jamming devices to disable communications in other establishments was indeed one of the causes of the 2019 hunger strike.

For this generation, the greater porosity between the Inside and Outside has placed detainees in a between two worlds that has turned prison into a non-place, one of suspension. The detainees are thus neither Inside nor Outside, unlike in the past when they were simultaneously present and politically active behind bars and in the Territories from the late 1970s up until Oslo. It is a struggle to reconstruct prison in terms of formative seclusion, its dimension as a radical experience of the collective and the political. For Saad Nimr, at the time cabinet director to the Minister of Prisoners' Affairs Issa Qaraq, the current generation is "in limbo," as it is too connected with the Outside, even if this reconnection has made it possible to maintain family ties. It has also helped trajectories by enabling educational and militant paths that were previously inaccessible. Certain detainees' digital presence on the internet via social media messaging systems, but also their Facebook profiles on ONG websites, or kept going by family and friends, help them to exist Outside. It has given new collective resonance to detainees' mobilizations, which have been massively relayed on social media by groups of friends, families, activists, and NGOs.

This mediatized prison dinner resulted in restrictions on detainee rights, which were already under discussion following the kidnapping of Corporal Shalit in Gaza in 2006 and Hamas' refusal to allow the ICRC to visit him. A government committee was set up to put an end to what were considered the Palestinian detainees' "privileges," to align their conditions of detention with those supposed of Shalit, and to put pressure on Hamas. This "Olmert Committee" led to the "Shalit restrictions" in June 2011, which the Palestinians named the Shalit Law (Qanun Shalit), and which above all ended the possibility of following university courses and continued the suspension of high-school exams.

University studies particularly developed in this period, however. In 2001, 290 Palestinian prisoners followed courses at Tel Aviv Open University. Some unauthorized to enroll followed in parallel, like Tamer. Thanks to mobile phones, others were able to access Palestinian university courses, or to complete courses started before their arrest. Abdel Nasser Ferwana, a former Gazan prisoner and head of the Gaza Prisoners and Ex-Detainees' Affairs Commission, reported that in 2003, Nasir Abdel Jawad defended his Chemistry

Mahmoud Bakr Hijazi had been described to me as the first Palestinian prisoner of war, or more specifically of the Palestinian revolution started by Fatah in 1965. We had arranged to meet at Zyriab café, the only spot in Ramallah before a myriad of bars, restaurants, and cafés with the same ubiquitous trendy décor opened. Zyriab has remained a place of refuge, where time seems suspended, where the Palestinian geographic, political, and imaginary space remains coherent, where past struggles can be told. Inside, it is a little dark, the walls hung with the owner, Tayseer Barakat's paintings. It is decorated with antique objects and has a Bedouin tent hanging inside. Mahmoud is of a slender build, his face emaciated, and was aged seventy-five years old when I met him on October 30, 2011. His family is from Jerusalem, even if he has always been refused a residency permit in the city since he returned to the West Bank in 2007 to be close to his relatives. He lived in Beirut in the 1970s, where he got married and had children, then in Yemen, and Gaza, where he returned in 1994 when the PA was established there.

In his husky smoker's voice, he tells the story of his life. He has already told it many times before, has constructed his account, knows its bifurcations, its powerful moments. As a child, he saw no difference between Jews, Christians, and Muslims. A Muslim by birth, his mother would dress him up for the Christian celebrations, which he would attend, even going to church. When Jewish migrants began to arrive at the time of the Holocaust, his grandmother would repeat: "It's haram [forbidden, sinful] what they did to the Jews in the war." "We helped them, we got on well, we had a very beautiful life. Things stayed like that until 1948, until the 'Poles' came, and the war began. Deir Yassin happened [the Deir Yassin massacre], and we saw them arrive in our homes in Jerusalem. Everything changed, love gave way to hate, we no longer saw roses only thorns. We used to live near a hospital; we would see the wounded, the dead; we heard the bombs. I wanted to do something for my country. I began to help Abd al-Kader Husseini's group, which was defending Jerusalem. I carried arms, drinks, sandwiches, cigarettes. I no longer liked the games my father brought me [he was twelve], I stopped going to school. I began to know all about arms. I became a different human being.

Then I joined the Jordanian army. I loved the sound of weapons. I couldn't go back to the school in the Musrara neighborhood. People had changed; the war had made them bitter, sad. I was posted on the walls of Jerusalem. It was in 1956, at the time of the Suez crisis. Gamal Abdel Nasser made his appeal to the Arab world. I was at the Damascus Gate, listening to the Egyptian radio on a little transistor. I went home, took a gun, and fired at Israelis in the street.

I didn't know what I was doing, but I told myself it would help Egypt. Then I took part in Fatah's first military operation on January 1, 1965. Before that, I used to say to Dr Mohamed [Yasser Arafat]: "The world hears nothing; we need to make a noise." I used to make artisanal bombs in jerricans with alcohol and TNT and blow them up. On January 17, 1965, I was coming back from Hebron in the Occupied Territory [Israel in its borders of the time] when they caught me. They wanted to know everything about the first operation and small attacks here and there, who was behind them, who was in charge [In the very beginning, Fatah, founded in 1959, did not claim responsibility for its operations]. I knew nothing.

They incarcerated me in Ramleh prison, in cell 139 where, they told me, Adolf Eichmann was imprisoned. I remained there alone for four years and eight months. I was condemned to death by hanging on four charges: carrying arms without a license; illegally entering Israel; belonging to a terrorist organization; murdering several Israelis. I requested that I be considered a prisoner of war [asir harb] and be defended by an outside lawyer. They had hanged Eichmann, but the government was torn over the death penalty. They judged me a second time, advising me to plead for clemency. I didn't recognize the State of Israel at that time, so I refused. They didn't want to recognize me as a prisoner of war but, through the intermediary of the union of Arab lawyers, Fatah was able to send Jacques Vergès, who came to visit me in Ramleh. When I saw him, I remembered that he was the French lawyer who had defended Djamilia Bouhired [the Algerian FLN resistance fighter] and married her. I was sentenced to life, and almost poisoned in prison, but I was hopeful.

In 1968, some Fatah members kidnapped a soldier on the Lebanese border to exchange him [tabadul]. There were fifty-four of us Fatah prisoners in Israel at the time. They agreed to free everyone except me. In the end, I was released on my own. They exchanged a man for a man on February 28, 1971. I went to Lebanon, and he returned to Israel. The ICRC served as the intermediary. I began a new life in Beirut. For the PLO, I was a prisoner of war [asir], not a detainee [sajin].”

From the Jordanian Prisons to the Generation of the Israeli Occupation (1967–1973)

Mahmoud’s story is at the junction between two historic moments: the end of Jordan’s control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Egypt’s control of the Gaza Strip, and the beginning of the Israeli occupation when he was already in prison. The Israeli occupation fueled the embryonic Palestinian resistance. Up until then, it was above all the communists who opposed the position of King Hussein of Jordan and his refusal, in annexing the West Bank in April 1950, to recognize the claim to Palestinian political autonomy. The members of the Communist Party were frequently incarcerated in Al-Jafr prison on the east bank of the River Jordan along with the Jordanian opposition. Their exchanges in detention led to the creation of a unified Jordanian Communist Party on both sides of the Jordan in 1951. In 1957, the opposition and the Communist Party were subjected to intense repression, and all parties, political organizations, and trade unions were banned following a series of riots against the Jordanian authorities after it removed Suleiman Nabulsi’s left-wing government from its functions following an attempted coup d’état led by officers close to Egypt. Martial law was declared, over 4,000 people were arrested in forty-eight hours, political parties were banned, men were thrown into prison, and women fired from their jobs, placed under house arrest, or more rarely exiled.

Born in the 1920s, Abu Hazem is a communist since the National Liberation League years in Palestine. He belongs to this generation of men who had already experienced British prisons in Palestine—he spent seven years in al-Moscobiyeh, where Palestinian nationalists and Jewish Irgun and Lehi activists responsible for terrorist attacks found themselves incarcerated together—then, above all those of Jordan. In 1957, he was sentenced to forty-four years in prison and spent eight years in Al-Jafr until King Hussein amnestied all political prisoners in 1965.

With the creation of Fatah in 1959, which took over the PLO in the late 1960s, small militant armed cells sought to set up in the West Bank and Gaza. Acting clandestinely, these groups were Fedayeen, some from neighboring countries, others living in the West Bank, Jerusalem, or Gaza. They also belonged to the Arab Nationalist Movement, then to the left-wing Palestinian parties born out of it—firstly, the PFLP, set up in 1967 and whose influence was on the rise at the time in the Occupied Territories, then the DFLP, its breakaway party formed in 1969. Both male and female, their members were young. Some improvised armed actions and attacks. Most of these cells were rapidly shut down and their members arrested. Other Fedayeen were captured during Israel’s military incursions into Jordan, notably in 1968 during the battle of Karameh, or in southern Lebanon. The emerging Palestinian organizations initially failed to establish bases in the West Bank.

“With the Occupation, everyone wanted to join [itqawam],” Majid told me, already a member of the PFLP when he was sentenced to life in 1968. He considered himself a soldier, like those belonging to the armed wings of the political parties. During their trials and in detention, they asked to be recognized as prisoners of war, which was always refused, especially as, during this period, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian prisoners of war were held in military camps and prisons following the 1967 War, then the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. The latter were mostly held in separate places and their conditions of detention were different, just as they were the object of negotiations regarding their repatriation and exchange with the less numerous Israeli prisoners of war held in the neighboring countries. “When I was sent to prison along with fourteen other people,” Majid continued, “only Mahmoud Hijazi was there along with a Palestinian refugee from Lebanon, and several other people. Rasmieh Odeh and PFLP women were in prison too. They were

Outside, you have problems all the time and you can’t do much. I wanted to study psychology, but I can’t, and I can’t manage to get married either. There’s a lot of unemployment. They don’t want to employ people from the camps and if they do, we are very poorly paid. I worked at the Movenpick [a luxury hotel] in room service for two months. I earned 450 dollars a month. I quit. It was too badly paid and too exhausting. If you aren’t in Fatah, you don’t stand a chance here. The Third Intifada is going to happen soon, in two or three months at the most because people are sick and tired and that’s all we are hoping for.”

The encouragement of consumerism and home ownership through a banking policy of household debt has forged more individualistic, competitive, materialistic neoliberal money-driven subjectivities that are a source of bitterness for those coming out of prison. Sami expressed this malaise before a society in which he no longer recognized himself on release, at over forty years old. Like in Tamer’s account, the meaning of time spent in prison collapses on contact with the existences and values of those who remained Outside. A member of the PFLP, Sami, was imprisoned for nine years (2002–2011) for having played an important part in the Second Intifada. At the time of our first discussion in his flower shop in Ramallah, he had been out for a year and was trying to find his place and felt a little isolated. He appeared to have stepped back from his political activities, but seemed pretty happy. A year later, I dropped by and found him despondent and bitter. The shop is not very big, and the flowers quite simple, hurriedly pushed in black plastic vases. His family prepared his return by opening this shop for him, which above all survives because it sells floral decorations for weddings and other celebrations. He sighed, in a voice laced with resentment:

“Life has changed 180 degrees, mentalities, daily life, the constructions everywhere, the millionaires... It’s hard. No, I’m not happy; I didn’t fight for this. So I prefer being with flowers than with people. This World Bank politics won’t get us far. People buy cars, houses. They only think of paying back their loans to the bank, they are scared of losing their jobs. They only look out for their affairs, not those of the country. It was better before the 2000s; life was about social life, it wasn’t about a new car or a new house.”

If the 2000s have seen a decline in the parties’ and the Prisoners’ Movement’s influence over prison life to the benefit of more individual and more recreational preoccupations, they have also been a period of porosity and increased interactions between the Inside and Outside. Clandestine practices have opened the prison up to the Outside and, in that respect, they have helped make it less of a “total” institution than for the previous generations.

The Olso generation was that of images, of the growing place of television, which impinged on the Golden Age of political detention’s world of writing. The al-Aqsa generation saw the more technological worlds of phones, then digital and social media, penetrate prison. Cell phones started to be smuggled into the men’s prisons while, up until May 2019, all phone access was forbidden to prisoners whether to call their families or their lawyers. They were particularly numerous during the first decade of the 2000s, especially in the former military tent camps, such as al-Naqab or Meggido, where smuggling is easier. There were at that time about sixty in Meggido and several per cell in many facilities. These cell phones were extremely expensive and purchased collectively, in general by factions, especially the more organized ones such as the Islamic parties, or by small groups of detainees. It was thus Hamas and Islamic Jihad who began to smuggle them in as they had more means to pay off the guards, then Fatah. They were shared and owned firstly by those serving long sentences. Those who were there for a short period bought minutes on another group’s phones. The prices I was told varied according to the model and the place, but remained astronomical—twenty times higher than what they cost Outside. A basic phone costs about 15,000 shekels (4 600 dollars), and a smartphone with a camera and internet access about 60,000 shekels (18 500 dollars). They are the object of a profitable business for the guards; some provide them, other seize them during searches, sometimes in concert with, and depending on, the situation.

Phones have thus become a means of daily communication with the Outside and above all with families—who in the past would often lose contact with their relatives due to the frequent bans on visits—, but also with lawyers and the associations. As the phone lines are tapped, or susceptible to being so, they are rarely used for political exchanges. Firas thus told me that in addition to Yussef al-Sadiq association’s regular

human beings. We are very clear in our position; we are against killing, and they kill, like Assad kills. We spoke with them. Some didn't change their position, so we removed them from our wing; some moved in our direction. Who took them? The Islamic Jihad and Fatah. They are present with the other organizations, but not with us. Even as an association [Firas runs the Yussef al-Sadiq association helping prisoners, set up in 2015 in prison and linked to the Southern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, but which seeks more widely to represent Israeli Palestinian political prisoners], we have no contacts with them or their families, even with those who are in a Fatah wing because they have not become Fatah.”

Porosity and the World of Networks

The carceral period that began in 2000 is described as a time of idleness, frustration, distortions, confusion, and as a cultural setback. The figure of the political detainee remained unchanged despite the profound changes to life behind bars, for this figure continued to play a symbolic and political function: it remained a consensual image that could be mobilized in calls for unity, a safeguard containing disintegration. The history of political incarceration and the sacralized figure of the prisoner indeed unites and recounts this common experience. It is all the more convoked when political fragmentation becomes patent. Collective values were nonetheless less pulverized in prison. The neoliberal subjectivities encouraged Inside were even more so Outside. Ex-prisoners recount a more preserved time behind bars than the situation they faced on release. Despite the new management's efforts to encourage individualism, difference, and privilege, in its violence that the deprivation of freedom represents and the sharing of daily life by people from distinct social groups, imprisonment forged a common experience. From Jawad's account of the Al-Amari camp in Ramallah, we can clearly see that the feeling of social equality experienced in detention contrasted sharply with the decisive increase in inequality and social segregation Outside at that time. Prison integrated people into a diversified social body, while living standards and ways of life Outside became stratified and compartmentalized. Since the Salam Fayyad government (2009–2013), neoliberal reforms have multiplied in the West Bank, even if they have failed to stem the clientelism and corruption that have continued to grow while authoritarianism has at the same time intensified. Unlike the previous Prime Ministers, Fayyad was not a Fatah politician. A former World Bank employee, he applied neoliberal methods in an effort to revive the Palestinian economy, to end corruption, and to introduce other modes of government, while at the same time building the Palestinian State “from the bottom up.”

Jawad is thirty-two years old and studying French at the Ramallah French-German Cultural Centre in the hope of marrying a French woman and building himself a future outside Palestine. He went to France for two months during a twinning program between the camp and the town of Stains in the Paris suburbs. He tells me he has not managed to get married yet for lack of money to pay all the costs involved in a wedding here for a man. We meet at the camp. His sitting room contains a few beaten-up sofas, a coffee table, and a television. On the TV set is a photo of his big brother, a member of Hamas, who has been in prison for twenty-one years after being jailed just before Oslo for stabbing soldiers in Jerusalem. He had four more years left to serve, but was released shortly after our meeting during the Shalit exchange in October 2011. Both his parents are dead. He is tense, containing an anger that sometimes spills over in flood of virulent words. Jawad was held in administrative detention in Naqab prison from 2003 to 2004. This prison is reputed to be tough. When I ask him about his experience that year, he answers that, after a while, prison is like a home:

“– I was fine, better than Outside at times. You eat, sleep, play, are in contact with lots of people, study.

– Not Outside?

– Inside, we are all the same. No one can claim to be superior to you.

Outside, depending on the neighborhood, the party, whether you are rich or poor, educated or not, people won't mix with you. There's an equality in prison and, at any rate, you have no choice. Outside, there isn't. There are rich neighborhoods, like the al-Masione district, which means the district of big thieves.

next to us—us in one wing, them in the other. The communists arrived just after.” Majid is from Jerusalem; he was thus incarcerated in Ramleh prison while the women were detained in the neighboring prison of Neve Tirtza.

Arrests multiplied rapidly in the West Bank and Gaza. In addition to those involved in armed activities or helping infiltrated Fedayeen, they targeted the men and women who belonged directly or indirectly to political or union organizations, all of which were banned—such as, for example, the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS)—and took part in demonstrations, distributed tracts, or helped the political parties. The communists were easily identifiable due to their past in the Jordanian prisons. From June to late December 1969, the number of detainees rose from 2,100 to 3,000 as crackdowns followed a wave of attacks. The men were by far in the majority. Only fifty-three women were incarcerated in August 1969 compared to 2,383 male prisoners.

Sentences for this membership or for militant activities were very harsh (from five to ten years) in order to stop these parties' influence from spreading. Contestation indeed grew during these early years of the Occupation, and civil and popular resistance actions spread among the youth in high schools and Birzeit University. It was practice to hold those who could not be convicted through lack of evidence in administrative detention for periods that were often extremely long, years and even decades. Just after the occupation, the percentage of administrative detainees was extremely high: on February 6, 1969, half of the prisoners were held as such (221 out of 450 security inmates); and they were 561 administrative detainees out of the 2,383 prisoners in August 1969. General Gazit, administrator of the Occupied Territories, explained, then, to Jacques Moreillon, representative of the ICRC, that they were not judged as there was an undesirable risk that they be acquitted, and that it was furthermore not advisable to divulge evidence that might endanger informers:

“Certain administrative detainees will be imprisoned for up to 25 years, or for life, without a sentence being handed down. The Israeli authorities have their reasons for keeping these people in prison without sending them to court but it is certain that if any evidence is discovered concerning some of them, they will be sentenced.”

During an interview, he concluded: “It is not impossible that we do away with all trials.”

Others were exiled, usually to Jordan. Most of the time in Gaza, the prison was overpopulated. In May 1970, 833 people were incarcerated there, for a capacity of 460, and there were at times up to thirty or so people sharing the same cell. Gazans were thus regrouped in military camps in the Sinai, for example, Nahel camp in March 1971 where 169 people—all administrative detainees—were held in the middle of the desert, 200 miles from Gaza City. Political figures were isolated by putting them under house arrest in remote places, notably Haidar Abdel Shafi, Faysal Husseini, and Ibrahim Abu Sitta in July 1969.

In December 1972, Jacques Moreillon announced possible recourse to the public denunciation of the Israeli authorities if the situation did not improve, given that fifty-seven Nablus prisoners were “isolated” together in a single cell, cut off from all outside access, and that fifty cases of serious abuse had been noted in the past two years. The ICRC's dilemma concerning the best strategy to obtain the necessary improvements was discussed incessantly, especially with regard corporal abuse and access to all the detainees. Those in charge were caught between contradictory discourses depending on the interlocutor (government officials, the army, etc.), or even the moment. Some denied the violence, while others showed themselves willing to shed light on what, in their terms, were nothing more than cases of “disobedience.” Others declared that they wanted to eradicate these practices or claimed to be favorable to extending visits to all. Yet, whatever the discourse proffered, these recurrent practices continued. At this rhythm, Moreillon wrote, “our presence in the prisons is a farce that we cannot take part in.” Those serving long sentences were transferred to Ramleh prison which, in early 1968, was the only high-security establishment until Ashkelon opened in December, where a considerable number of Gaza inhabitants were held due to its proximity with the Gaza Strip. In January 1970, Beer-Sheva high-security prison was inaugurated to alleviate Gaza prison's overcrowding. The Palestinians did not remain for long in the detention centers of the Occupied Territories,

which were mainly destined for interrogations and pre-trial detention. Only two prisons for those serving long sentences existed in the Territories at the time, situated in Nablus and Gaza, which also held a few women detainees.

The ICRC was able to supply books to most of the prisons as of the early 1970s, and notably schoolbooks and a few others, but their subjects were tightly controlled and scientific and political works were for the most part banned. Detainees at the time had access to the only (pro-government) Israeli Arab newspaper, Al-Amba, and very little authorized access to the radio. Transistors began to be smuggled in. Little libraries were constituted. The prisoners organized a schooling system, with classes held by incarcerated teachers. They were tolerated by the authorities, who, on the other hand, refused outside Arab teachers access to the prisons. Already in this period, some sat their high-school exams (tawjihi), even if educational possibilities remained very patchy depending on the prison and remained a privilege that could be taken away for disciplinary or political reasons.

Through their close dialogue with the Israeli authorities, the ICRC worked mainly on “non-political rehabilitation” of prisoners, notably their education, but also their right to sports, family visits, and work. Its humanitarian mandate to assist victims in contexts of conflict prevented a taking into account of the political stakes of Palestinian detention. This position created a kind of institutional blindness regarding the political perception or dimension of some of its actions. Work was thus only envisaged in terms of rehabilitation. It occupied prisoners’ time, helped calm the atmosphere, made it possible to acquire skills while also earning a little money necessary for the improvement of daily life and to buy basic necessities in the little stores—known as canteens or commissary—that opened in many penitentiaries as of 1970, at the same time that the staples provided by the families were gradually banned. The ICRC thus petitioned the Israeli authorities to provide as many as possible with a job, and for decent remuneration to replace cigarettes. For the Israeli authorities, however, work either provided a cheap workforce to support its war effort and benefit the country’s economy, or, a minima, was a means of reducing the cost of detaining Palestinians, which, as their numbers and detention time grew, represented a financial burden. They thus used Palestinian prisoners to build Beer-Sheva prison and Jewish Israeli common law prisoners to surveil the Palestinians, as had already been experimented at Ramleh. The Israeli authorities also off-loaded certain costs onto the ICRC, making it pay for the parcels containing extra wares, clothes, and cigarettes when family visits were banned, and for books—and notably schoolbooks—notebooks, pens, medical care, and so on.

At first, the detainees did not have a unanimous view of prison work; some felt that it was of immediate advantage. Over time, this view became increasingly negative, especially as in the prisons located in Israel (eight out of fifteen), work was obligatory and described as forced labor. They first of all opposed against all army-related work: making camouflage netting or army uniforms. Then, they refused any work serving the Israeli economy (making packaging for fruit, batteries, gluing envelopes, etc.), organizing labor strikes, then observing strict hunger strikes in opposition. In the late 1970s, the parties that mobilized in detention adopted a common position against all work not directly relating to the Palestinian men and women prisoners’ daily lives. Their repeated strikes and opposition finally brought an end to Palestinian political prisoners’ labor.

The Occupation generation prisoners were not long politicized and, moreover, were scattered in multiple sites; they had to build networks from inside the prisons and invent channels to circulate information between them, and between the prisons and the outside. With the first mobilizations and work strikes came the right to visits and showers, but it was above all the hunger strikes that laid the foundations and strategies of struggle in detention and its organizational structures. Their demands sought to improve prison conditions, to obtain books, pens, notebooks, mattresses, to stop the physical brutality inflicted on detainees, but also more generally to contest the politics of incarceration and the Occupation. Already in 1968, Ramleh prison was precursory in deploying unlimited hunger strikes as a mode of resistance. The strikes then grew, bringing together several prisons. For the first time in a unified movement, thousands of prisoners simultaneously went on hunger strike in six prisons on April 28, 1970, including the Neve Tirtza women

He is critical of political choices that have all failed: both the Oslo Accords, which he was never in favor of, and the armed struggle, which he rejects at present. He embodies another vision of resistance, one inscribed in the prolongation of the civil society mobilizations of the First Intifada, as opposed to the armed Al-Aqsa Intifada. He is in alignment with the BDS movement’s vision. Like a growing proportion of the population—albeit still the minority, around 30%—he has gone from the aim of national liberation and a two-state solution to the demand for citizen rights in a single State. Others refuse to pronounce on the alternative between one or two States, which they consider out of their range, to focus on local sovereignties; some envisage an Israel-Palestine confederation, adopting a post-State, or even post-national perspective. This represents a profound strategic rupture in militant stances in Palestine and challenges Fatah’s political line and even that of the other parties and does so beyond partisan logics and discipline.

Since 2013–2014, demonstrations and riots have continued to spread in the West Bank and in Jerusalem. In June 2014, the murder of sixteen-year-old adolescent, Mohammad Abu Khdeir, burned alive by young settlers, deeply scarred minds. It was followed by the war that the Israeli army launched on Gaza in the summer of 2014, right in the middle of Ramadan. Another attack on civilians perpetrated by extremist settlers known as the Hilltop Youth on July 31, 2015, in the village of Douma, near to Nablus, constituted another deep collective shock. A firebomb was thrown into the house of the Dawabsheh family in the middle of the night as they slept. Both parents and their eighteen-month-old baby died from their burns. Protests were accompanied by a series of ram attacks (‘amelieh al-hadeth—sing) against Israelis in Fall 2014, then, in Fall 2015, knife attacks (‘amelieh ta’n—sing), and, very rarely, gun attacks perpetrated in the city of Jerusalem by often young Palestinians with no specific political affiliation. A majority indeed acted alone; others dissimulated their membership in order to avoid mass arrests in their parties. Some factions a posteriori claimed responsibility for actions that they had not planned in order to hide their loss of influence and their powerlessness to occupy a place of resistance—and this even going against the partisan line and ethos. The PFLP thus ended up honoring as martyrs two young men who carried out a knife and ax attack in the synagogue of one of Mohammad Abu Khdeir’s murderers. They did not belong to the PFLP, this party rejects all operations against civilians, but their uncle, a PFLP militant, managed in spite of the waves it made internally to gain them this posthumous recognition.

Mass arrests began again in 2014. According to Israeli police figures, 13,505 West Bank Palestinians and 3,891 from East Jerusalem were arrested in 2014. After having fallen to 4,281 at the end of December 2011, the number of security detainees rose to 6,391 in late 2015. Many young detainees from this time of the Small Uprising (habbeh) thus found themselves with no partisan identification on their arrival in prison. They were automatically integrated into the sections of the majority party, considered the “mother organization” (oum al-fasayl), that is, Fatah. According to Shabas’ classification, at the end of 2015, 574 remained unaffiliated (i.e., 9%). Non-partisans listed by the prison services thus doubled between 2007 and 2015—a minimalist proportion, as circumstantial, post-detention, or lapsed affiliations are not visible. This tendency has been confirmed. While the proportion of Fatah and Hamas members had hardly changed in relation to 2007—respectively, a half and a quarter of the 5,500 political prisoners—at the end of 2018, that of the other factions had fallen (from 20 to 15%), and 10% were unaffiliated. The remaining 1% declared that they belonged to the Islamic State or to other Jihadist groups to have emerged on the international stage.

In addition to the difficulty of integrating a youth that claimed to answer to no authority other than fighting the Occupation in diverse, unstructured ways was that of the presence in the prisons of a minority claiming allegiance to al-Qaeda, then Daesh (ISIS) for most of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, whom Shabas did not authorize as having their own organization. Hamas refused to integrate them into its prison branch, given its conflict with a Salafi-jihadist opposition in Gaza. They therefore joined Fatah, Islamic Jihad, or remained apart. Firas told me:

“When I was in prison, Daesh wasn’t yet present; it was al-Qaeda. We didn’t want them; I wouldn’t willingly approach a snake. They are takfiri,⁹³ Salafi jihadists who want to divide Islam. For me, they are apostates [qufar], their thinking is diabolic [shaytani], they aren’t only a danger for Christians, but for all

He evoked the problem of leadership, particularly within Fatah:

“Today, the qaid [leader] is no longer a qaid. In the Prisoners’ Movement, everyone leads their own strike [he was referring to the multiplication of individual or small group hunger strikes, mostly to protest against administrative detention orders]. When you take a decision, it no longer applies to everyone. The only one who can take a party decision and that is applied is Hamas. There are disputes, but they don’t explode the party. Why? It’s the result of Oslo, the al-Aqsa Intifada and the new generation. Marwan Barghouti is a national leader [qaid watani] Outside, but Inside? I don’t think so, because there are divisions between the northern Fatah and the southern one, between its military branch and the rest, etc. Oslo weakened them. The PFLP, which was the most solid, has major financial problems because it receives money from the PLO. The PLO opens and closes the floodgates to put pressure on this party, and the result is that they have difficulty in taking common political decisions. I lived in the same cell as Ahmad Saadat, and I really respect this party. We all grew up with the PFLP and here [in the Palestinian community in Israel] with Abna al-balad⁸⁵ [two ideologically close parties founded in the late 1960s/early 1970s]. The PFLP played a major historical role in our political culture. We were young [Firas was forty-five at the time of our discussion], we were all in Abna al-Balad, we were immersed in it, and it’s the same for the PFLP.”

The rivalry and lack of unified command between those involved in the Uprising (the various groups of the Fatah camp and Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and PFLP partisans), coupled with the Israeli repressive apparatus, which constituted territorial units cut off from one another, accentuated the formation of extremely localized political and military alliances. Regional leaders competed with the partisan representatives, which had effects on detention.

After 2007, the generation that joined that of al-Aqsa Inside was all the more disparate as it was even less affiliated to a partisan system contested on every level by the youth and the new forms of civil society mobilization that constantly grew. As of 2009, it was thus the activists and youth from villages involved in the peaceful popular resistance who were most often arrested. In the village of Nabi Saleh, which has a population of approximately 600 inhabitants, over 100 people were sentenced between 2009 and 2012, not counting the foreign and Israeli activist who took part in the weekly actions. This movement, which re-localized the resistance and which asserted its nonviolence, was born in 2003 with the creation of village committees and the launching of their first demonstrations. It spread throughout the West Bank in the villages affected by the Wall and the settlements, such as Bi’lin, Ni’lin, Beit Umar, Kufr Qaddum, Nabi Saleh, or the Jordan Valley. Through weekly demonstrations and innovative actions (performances, the ex-nihilo creation of the Bab al-Shams village near to Jerusalem in January 2013 and that of Ein Hijleh in the Jordan Valley in 2014), which sought to win the battle of images and rally international opinion, these village committees defended local rights to resources, to cultivating the land, to circulation, and so on—in other words, the “same rights” that the Israelis enjoy in a de facto common space. Few claimed a partisan belonging.

Bassem Tamimi from the village of Nabi Saleh—one of its leading figures at present along with his daughter Ahed—was a Fatah member of the militant First Intifada generation. He was born in 1967. He has been administratively detained a dozen times. In 2011, he was sentenced to thirteen months in prison and a seventeen-month suspended sentence for his role as a leader of the popular resistance. In keeping with the methods employed by the military courts to crush these mobilizations, he was incriminated by two fourteen-year-olds whom he supposedly urged to throw stones. A civil servant at the Ministry of the Interior, his Fatah affiliation has become distended over time, as he is critical of the conflicts and the tendency to put party interests before national questions.

“I was Fatah, but now I’m first and foremost Palestinian. When I agree with a direction taken by Fatah, I’m Fatah; when I share Hamas’ position, I’m Hamas. Today, the problem is that the party has become more important than the cause it defends. When Fatah men come out to beat people in demonstrations [he is referring here to incidents that took place in March 2011 during the youth protests of the short-lived Palestinian Spring], I take to the streets even if I am a Sulta employee.”

prisoners. Their slogan called to end the Occupation, long-term administrative detention, and torture. It gained traction outside, as Jewish and Arab figures manifested their solidarity; women, and student bodies protested, and appeals were made to international institutions.

Along with that at Beit Lyd (Kfar Yona) in 1969, the first strike to become inscribed in carceral memory, however, was that of Asqalan (Ashkelon) in July 1970. Both were in protests at these two prisons’ particularly brutal conditions of incarceration. Strikes and riots followed in succession at Asqalan in the early 1970s due to the martial discipline that reigned and the physical abuse inflicted there, especially in its in-house interrogation center. Prisoners serving long sentences or subjected to punitive measures were sent there. The ICRC delegates described a “shocking and sinister” atmosphere. All the detainees they were able to speak to without witnesses present described recurrent violence, being put in the pound for no reason, while some became “invisible” for long periods. No books or notepads were permitted, nor any activity; prisoners regularly had their heads shaved; collective prayers were banned. Inmates were not allowed to sit on the covers they slept on at night, having to content themselves with the floor and sometimes had to remain silent in their cells. They had to walk in single file and in silence in the exercise yard, their hands behind their backs. Guards demanded that they be addressed as *sidi*, a title of respect that the detainees refused to continue to use when they began their hunger strike on July 15, 1970, a strike that lasted about a fortnight. One person died—Abd al-Kader Abu al-Fahim—after being force-fed by tube, a practice used in those days to break the strikes. This strike left an indelible mark on the collective memory. Asqalan prison became a sinister, then heroic, detention legend where the prisoners’ values were forged and the contours of political resistance to the prison system and the Occupation were shaped from inside the prisons. This prison was henceforth considered a leader in the community of prisoners.

Saad, Tarek, Radi, and the Others. The Prison Model and the World of Writing: The Prisoners’ Movement Generation (1974–1987): The Repression and Politicization of Civilian Mobilizations in the Occupied Territories

As the Occupation lastingly took hold, grassroots civilian mobilizations increased, massively involving high schools, then the universities that were being created at the time. Regional peoples’ committees formed, along with party and PLO-affiliated associations and civilian committees (the General Union of Palestinian Students, the General Union of Palestinian Women, etc.). The Palestinian National Front (PNF), which emerged in the Territories, brought militantism out of clandestinity and away from the predominance of armed struggle. As a civilian, public, pluri-organizational, left-leaning body, and the PLO’s support base in Palestine, the PNF mobilized local politicians, professional unions, associations, student groups, charities, and large swathes of the population around overt opposition to the Occupation while at the same time seeking to establish a dialogue with the Israeli leaders. Close to the line of the Jordanian and Palestinian Communist Parties, it already defended in 1967 the idea of creating a Palestinian State alongside the Israeli State in the Occupied Territories, contrary to the PLO. It was a period of intense demonstrations, strikes, and socio-political activism. Although banned at the time, Palestinian flags were flown, photos of the PLO leaders posted up, and graffiti appeared calling for resistance. These mobilizations and all forms of public organization and protest were severely repressed. In 1974, the deportation and arrest of those related to the PNF multiplied. Many communist figures were also arrested when the Israeli authorities wrongly accused the PNF of being the armed wing of the Jordanian Communist Party. Waves of arrests and the torture of PNF members followed.

Unlike the previous generation, only a few of those sent to prison were involved in military operations; the rest belonged to political parties and many were simply members of civil society organizations, professionals, or university or high-school students who politically organized their actions within the student unions and committees in their secondary or higher education establishments. Moreover, it was a generation that came from the West Bank and Gaza; there were indeed almost no Fedayeen infiltrated from the

neighboring countries, or members of the exiled PLO among them.

I distinguish seven historic generations of prisoners, six of whom have come after the 1967 occupation. These historic generations are “unified groups of individuals who encounter historic conjunctures or periods at the same moment of their life cycle”. I have constituted these prison generations, on the one hand, based on the period of their detention and, on the other, on the importance of their roles and prison experiences in their own view, as they tell it, and in the eyes of the prison community and beyond. Those having served long sentences, or several sentences, first as adolescents then later in life, have indeed traversed the years Inside. Though, they have acquired a social and/or political maturity, a position of leader, distinguishing themselves at given times, within a specific generation, of which they are either the little-known actors or, for some, emblematic.

The October 1973 War, and above all the international recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people following the Rabat Arab League summit, then the UN’s reception of a delegation and Yasser Arafat’s speech before the General Assembly in 1974, boosted the militant impetus. Strikes and protest marches of an unprecedented magnitude took place in all towns, rallying large numbers of students. They were met with the violence of the army, arrests, and the summary trials of students and youths, most of whom did not belong to any party.

Saad Nimr was fifteen at the time and lived in Jenin. He was almost sixty when I met him again in Ramallah in May 2016, and was a Political Sciences lecturer at the University of Birzeit. Previously, he was chief of staff to the Minister of Prisoners’ Affairs, Issa Qaraqe, after heading the International Campaign to Free Marwan Barghouti and All Palestinian Prisoners. As Arafat gave his speech to the UN, a young eighteen-year-old woman was crushed by a tank during a demonstration in Jenin. It was the first time that such a thing happened. Protests intensified and the mayor, accompanied by the entire town, came out to follow the funeral procession. Saad was among them. Clashes with the army ensued.

“At 1 a.m., they carried out a major arrest operation [‘ameliyeh i’tiqalieh]. Over seventy people were arrested. I don’t know why, but I was on their list. I was terrified; I had no experience of all that. They blindfolded and handcuffed me as I was held face down on the ground, their feet on my back, then they took me to the Jenin Muqata’a [where the interrogation center was]. There, there were seventy of us in a tiny room, piled on top of one another. I was still blindfolded. Then, at about 2 a.m., we were taken one by one into interrogation. They asked me if I had thrown stones—I said no—if I had demonstrated—I said no, that I had gone to the funeral with the mayor. A man wrote in Hebrew, then asked me to sign it. I was scared; I signed. At 3 a.m., I found myself in court; it lasted two minutes, I was accused of having thrown stones at the army, someone testified against me, and I was sentenced to six months and transferred to Jenin prison. They gave me clothes, I understood nothing and thought I was going to wake up from this nightmare. The other prisoners helped us. It’s hard when you arrive in a society you don’t know, a prison society [mujtama’ sijn]. When I was released, I saw things differently. It had changed everything in me. I joined a political organization [tanzim]. In 1975, at the age of sixteen, I was a member of the DFLP and I was given six months for that. I was released at the end of 1975. In August 1976, I was arrested again with five friends and charged for my activities in the party—nonviolent, unarmed activities. The judge deemed that I was a re-offender, as I had already served two prison sentences. I was sentenced to seven years. I was just over seventeen. I was held in Jenin prison, then in Nablus. I took my high school exams [tawjih] in prison. I came out at the age of twenty-three and enrolled for a BA in Political Sociology at An-Najah University in Nablus. Before, I wanted to be an engineer, but after my political readings in prison, I abandoned the sciences. The Prisoners’ Movement was very strong at that time; it was very different to now.”

In those days, the time spent in prison politicized people. For the youngest, the carceral moment prompted personal bifurcations that led them to join a party; for others who were already partisans, it helped sharpen their political ideology and values, and constituted a crucial stage in their militant paths. The youth were particularly targeted by the repression. In Nablus, Abu George and many young people shared similar experiences when they were fourteen, fifteen, or sixteen. Arrested for having written Fatah political slogans,

went to prison for that, because it’s for the people that we did what we did. There are big marches on Prisoners’ Day [April 17], but I get the impression that there’s only one day a year when people think about them.

With the al-Aqsa Intifada, Fatah members were sent back to prison en masse after having for a while become less numerous in many facilities than Hamas. They took back control of leadership and everywhere, the prisoners’ general representative became Fatah-affiliated again.

The separation between religious and secular parties Inside occurred in the wake of the Hamas/Fatah rupture following the 2006 legislative elections. In the summer of 2007, this led to the existence of two competing authorities: one in the West Bank presided over by Mahmoud Abbas, and the other in Gaza presided by Ismaïl Hanieh of Hamas. This major political rift translated in detention into a spatial separation decided on by the prison services. It also often led to the election of two general representatives in each prison instead of one—one for the PLO secular parties, and the other for the religious parties—when, in places where it was possible, they for a time no longer visited nor spoke to one another. In April 2007, of the 9,250 detainees under its responsibility, Shabas listed 4,457 Fatah members (48%), 421 PFLP members (4,5%), and 113 DFLP members (1,3%), on the one hand; and 2,389 Hamas members (26%) and 1,312 Islamic Jihad members (14, 2%), on the other; 516 remained unaffiliated (5,6%).

This separation did not, however, follow the political fault lines between those in favor of Oslo and the parties opposed to the Accords (the PFLP, the DFLP, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad). This further weakened the internal organization. Farid of Hamas told me that at Meggido, then, the PFLP had wanted to join the wings where the religious parties were housed, a move that the prison warden refused. The factions that had refused the Accords were on the whole in favor of all forms of combat, including armed struggle. But with the al-Aqsa Intifada, this tactical choice divided even within Fatah—a disagreement to which was added the Fatah leaders’ vying for influence as they sought to assert themselves after Yasser Arafat’s death in 2004.

Fatah members entering detention found few elders and a weakly-organized partisan life Inside, contrary to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or PFLP militants. As opponents, Islamic Jihad and Hamas and to a lesser degree the PFLP had maintained their presence since the First Intifada. Well-versed in a constantly semi-clandestine partisan organization, they had conserved disciplined prison branches, whereas Fatah failed to reestablish its own, prey to rivalry and dissension, losing its ability to take unitary decisions. New Fatah prisoners indeed belonged to different and sometimes rival groups: the Fatah leaders involved in the al-Aqsa and Tanzim (the party’s military organization) mobilizations, and in the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, such as Marwan Barghouti; others belonging to the party’s security services who had joined the Uprising; younger local leaders engaged in the movement and seeking a place in the party; and finally, barely politicized armed youth having joined the Intifada. Fatah’s decentralized structure was further reinforced after the arrest of Marwan Barghouti. Some refused to give up their arms and to abandon resistance once the PA, run by Mahmoud Abbas, had reestablished complete security cooperation with the Israeli authorities, and actively participated in crushing the armed struggle in its ranks and in the West Bank by reforming the security services under the auspices of the United States (the Dayton Plan) after 2007. Armed bands developed, at a junction between resistance actions, delinquency, and mafia trafficking. At times they were “simple expressions of localisms, clan belongings, or even strictly personal interests”, affiliated for some to Palestinian intelligence service cadres or to rival, then dissident figures within Fatah, like Mohamed Dahlan, especially in the refugee camps, such as the Balata camp in Nablus. Fatah was thus “undermined by its divisions (returnees/locals; the young/old; partisans/opponents to the armed struggle) and by some of its cadres’ competing appetites for power”. Some were incarcerated in Israel, while others began to find themselves in the PA prisons, along with Hamas, Islamic Jihad, then left-wing opponents. The limited political socialization of some of these new detainees, first linked to the world of arms, contributed to the disintegration of the prison branch of Fatah, which was riddled by political divergences, but also personal rivalry, clientelist interests, and diverse trafficking.

Firas worked on the Prisoners’ Document for Hamas. He is a Palestinian citizen of Israel belonging to the Islamic Movement in 48 Palestine (Israel) close to Hamas, and one of the leaders of this party in detention.

earlier, after four and a half years in prison. His poise and build are impressive for someone so young. He is wearing a gray polyester suit, a dark shirt without a tie, black shoes, like the Fatah leaders of the previous generation. He calls me “Doctora” and addresses me with an old-fashioned deference due to my academic status and the fact that I am his elder. He describes himself as a politician. He was a member of Fatah and is still so in his heart, but is no longer active in a party that,

“like Hamas for that matter, has become a “company”. Abu Mazen [President Mahmoud Abbas] and Salam Fayyad [at the time Prime Minister] have “killed” all the parties, have turned them into businesses, and are only interested in the economy even though there is still an occupation going on. The moment they [the Israelis] decide to shut everything down, to stop everything, everything stops. Hamas is the same, as they have become an Authority [Sulta] in Gaza, and that being, it’s the end. I’m against this office government [makatib]. The Sulta [Palestinian Authority] and Fatah are two separate things. The Sulta stops us from resisting, and there are also a lot of Fatah members in Palestinian prisons [run by the PA in the West Bank]. After my release, they came to my house to search all over to take my arms. Today, no one does anything for the cause anymore, but, you’ll see, in a few years’ time there will be a change. I’m not only talking about a third Intifada, but you’ll see. When Arafat was besieged in the Muqata’a, I was among the group of young people who came to defend him and I spent the whole siege with him. For me, he was a leader, a great man (kabir). Everyone loved him, whatever the party, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and all those who met him. We had very little food in the Muqata’a because of the siege. I brought him an apple that he ate, then a woman brought him some soup. He refused it saying he’d already had an apple, she insisted saying he was our leader [qaid], but he didn’t want it.

I ask why he was sent to prison:

“I was charged for having received money from abroad to support the Intifada and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. I was put in isolation for quite a long time with about twenty other people. I was at Nafha in the Negev with Barghouti. In prison, there’s no big man [kabir] or little man [daghbir], everyone is the same. At the end of each day, it is an eighteen-year-old girl who shuts all of our doors. There was one who I often talked to who was studying Economics; I used to help her. I often spoke with the guards. Some were doing their military service, others were Shabas employees; they too were shut up all day long. But when they entered our cells for the searches [taftish], not a word. They were professional. In prison, there’s a bad side and of course you only have one desire—to get out—but there’s also a good side: we were all together, we supported one another, we never left anyone alone, sad. We would talk to him, say, you are a combatant (munadil), you are strong, you have done things for your country. We sang too—nationalist, resistance songs.

He lived the Hamas/Fatah scission on the Inside. He says that it was not that perceptible, that there were no “physical” battles, that the prisoners remained together in some facilities, and that in others, the Israelis separated them for security reasons. After having unofficially followed classes at the Tel Aviv Open University through the intermediary of another prisoner who translated for him because he did not receive authorization for security reasons (bitakhon—Hebrew) and because his Hebrew was not good enough to be able to follow alone, he went back to his studies on his release.

“Prisoners only pay half the course fees, but for some, like me, it was totally free because I had responsibilities on behalf of the students before at university. After, I should have got a job as a director general (mudir ‘am) in one of the PA ministries because I had studied, but I refused; I don’t want to work in an office. I would like to become a university lecturer to teach my students the right things. I was shocked when I came out: the young women, the way they dress, the money, the cars. That [he points to a group of young women leaving the café, not wearing hijabs, in jeans and tight tops], that’s Ramallah. I won’t say any more because we won’t agree, but we are an occupied people and we are Muslim. During the Intifada, we stopped bars or shops from openly selling alcohol. I am shocked that so few youths know the history of their country, and where they come from when they live in a camp. It wasn’t like that in Syria, where my family is [after taking refuge in Syria, they, like Tamer, now live in the Jalazone camp near to Ramallah]. All they think about is the latest cell phone, a new shirt to buy, both the young men and women. And we, we fought, we

or slogans denouncing the Occupation on the city walls, for having thrown stones at settler buses or public buildings, for demonstrating, waving a Palestinian flag, meeting publicly, or celebrating a national event, they served several months in prison. They were put through the traumatic interrogation experience at a very young age, during which they were beaten and often tortured. They were frequently arrested for periods that were more or less long, and regularly were sent to, and released from, prison. In the 1980s, Abu George told me, every year before Eid, 19 Land Day (March 30), the anniversary of the beginning of the Palestinian Revolution (January 1), or on other national occasions, they would come to get forty or so youth whom they would keep in detention for a fortnight to avoid protests: “We knew that, and would prepare our bags and wait for them.”

In the early 1980s, control over the Occupied Territories intensified. In 1981, a so-called civil administration was created within the Israeli army to manage the Palestinian population. The policy of mass arrests and forced exile intensified as mobilizations spread, prefiguring the First Intifada. From this point on, not only activists, but also those suspected of being their acquaintances, friends, and family also began to be arrested. The so-called Tamir Law passed in 1980 allowed convictions with no evidence or confessions, based simply on third-party statements. Torture became a common practice during interrogations. The Palestinian National Front and the National Orientation Committee were banned in 1982. In 1986, all Palestinian parties were officially declared illegal terrorist organizations, as were many associations and civil organizations.

The Prisoners’ Movement: The Carceral Structure of the National Movement

Aged between twenty-five and thirty, other slightly older incarcerated or reincarcerated men were already seasoned party members, some of whom held important positions in the partisan hierarchy. In the early 1970s, the prisoners developed interpersonal relations according to whom they knew or their place of origin. They then grouped together according to their partisan affiliations. When someone high-ranking went to prison, he would step forward to take over leadership of the group (qiyadeh fardieh); as the number of detainees increased, several leaders emerged within each political organization. In about 1975, the parties adopted internal rules setting up elections and committees to manage cultural, educational, administrative, security, financial, external affairs (the latter concerning relations with the other parties). Internal political and administrative representation structured political life on the Inside and its articulation with partisan life Outside. It framed relations and communication with the prison administration, particularly during conflicts. As incarceration became a mode by which the Israeli authorities governed the Occupied Palestinian Territories, this shared experience became central to the experience of nationhood and citizenship, and forged a political entity from inside the men’s prisons: the Palestinian Political Prisoners’ Movement (Harakeh al-asir al-filastini), linked to the PLO Outside. The political parties and the PLO took charge of the prisoners financially. A department took care of the families of martyrs and prisoners. They had a political and symbolic role, and a significant place in the national movement as frontline combatants, or soldiers.

In the 1980s, the internal partisan organization—that of the political prisoners in each prison—and the networks of communication between prisons, and between the prison branches of the organizations and parties Outside, followed the established rules and channels. These structures remained largely the same even if, over time, they no longer exerted the same influence over life in detention.

Every eight to twelve months, each party elected a delegate (mandub ou masul al-tanzim) to the general Prison General National Committee (lajneh watanieh ‘ameh), and the majority party elected a representative of all the detainees of every prison for a duration of for one to two years (mumathil al-'am al mu'taqal). The latter had to be accepted by the General National Committee and was entrusted with interacting with the prison administration. This elected representative has nearly always been a member of Fatah, apart from during the Oslo period. Sub-committees dealing with affairs common to all prisoners emerged to manage administrative issues, sports, and certain cultural and educational questions, conjointly elaborated at each

prison level. For the more administrative affairs, those in charge (shawish—sing.) of food, exercise, and so forth, were also nominated as the intermediaries between Shabas and the detainees, who were not supposed to engage with the administration directly. The political prisoners managed at that time to take charge of the cooking, stocking, and distributions of meals in most of the prison establishments, thereby ensuring their quality and—thanks to the circulation of the meal staff—creating essential channels of communication between the wings. More generally speaking, workplaces where daily tasks were carried out under the supervision of the parties (the kitchens, laundries, provisions rooms, libraries, cleaning) were spaces of exchange and circulation of information. As Maher told me:

“Until the 2000s, the kitchens were left to us, as was the laundry, and cleaning the cells. It was very positive. There were about fifty people working on these different chores at Asqalan when I was there. It depended on the prisons, but on the whole, that’s how it was. In the 2000s, they began to take that out of the political prisoners’ hands and reintroduced a wing of Jewish and [Israeli] Arab common law prisoners in every prison to do this work. The food became bad, so we got hold of electric hobs in the cells to make what we wanted.”

The Prisoners’ Movement governed the time spent in prison and coordinated prison struggles while at the same time taking part in those waged in the Territories. Militant and intellectual paths were conjointly forged Inside and Outside, and often in to-and-fro between these two spaces, prison militancy constituting a key stage in the partisan career. Progression through the ranks of partisan organizations was one of the main motifs of arrest.

In most analyses highlighting the porosity between inside and outside prison in France, Europe, or the United States, this continuum is seen in a negative light, as a “continuous system of constraints and control on either side of the prison walls”, of social practices that mutually exacerbate one another in a vicious circle. Here, however, this porosity is also remarkable for the carceral citizenships that operate within it, and for the socialization and political and intellectual paths that prison consolidates or to which it gives rise.

Born in 1953, Ahmad Saadat, current Secretary General of the PFLP, climbed the ranks of the PFLP during his many stretches in prison, where he has spent more than twenty-five years in total. Already active in the student branch of the PFLP when he was in high school, he joined the party in 1969, aged sixteen. He had his first brush with prison before 1974 when he was sentenced to several months on three separate occasions. When he was sentenced to four years in 1976, he had just passed his teaching diploma. In 1993, at the age of forty, he was elected to the PFLP political bureau thanks to his leadership and to his educational activities and organization of prison life. In 1994, he became head of the party in the West Bank after having again been administratively detained, then declared “wanted” when the authorities attempted to quash the PFLP, which was very active during the First Intifada. In 2001, he was elected Secretary General of the PFLP for the first time. In 2006, again incarcerated in Israel, he became a deputy from inside prison. Since, he has been serving a thirty-year sentence.

Also re-elected a deputy from inside prison in 2006, Marwan Barghouti, member of the Palestinian National Council, was incarcerated for the first time in 1974 at the age of fifteen. He joined Fatah at that time. Condemned for belonging to Fatah in 1978, he passed his high-school diploma, learned Hebrew, founded the youth wing of Fatah in prison, and then became its leader. On release in 1983, he enrolled in a History and Political Sciences BA, which he was only able to complete ten years later in 1993 after having been an administrative detainee, then exiled to Jordan just before the First Intifada when he was President of the Student’s Union. Elected to the Fatah Revolutionary Council during his time in exile, he became the Secretary General of Fatah in the West Bank on his return in 1994. First elected deputy in 1996, he completed his Master’s in International Relations in 1998. He was once again arrested in 2002 during the Second Intifada for his role in the uprising, and notably for having founded and led Fatah’s military wing (al-Tanzim) and for his involvement in the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, an armed faction of Fatah. In 2004, he received five life sentences and forty years.

The new prison management thus strove to shape political prisoners’ subjectivities by shifting from the uniquely repression-based control that characterized the previous periods to dispositions that also draw on more productive facets of power by eliciting forms of adhesion: in other words, a shift from subjectivation through violence to the attempt to forge more neoliberal subjectivities. I draw here on Michel Foucault’s very early analysis of neoliberalism as a world vision, as a global project that is not only economic but above all political, a “biopolitical modernization” that profoundly transforms society and the relations that individuals have with themselves, no longer through disciplinary processes but based on an “optimization of difference,” of stratification and competition, and of emulation—a project that is elaborated thanks to the adhesion and participation of all. This political carceral management is, in certain respects, inscribed in a “post-disciplinary or governmental prison” model, as analyzed by Gilles Chantraine, who draws on the work of Zygmunt Bauman on Pelican Bay State Prison: a pure instrument of neutralization which, in its ultimate form, would see “rights be more respected, risks hyper-evaluated, security-based communications reinforced, the influence of leaders reigned in, detainees emulated, their autonomy controlled, their privileges meted out, their hopes fragmented, and their solidarity shut down.”

Former prisoners have all described a period that saw the abandoning of values, of solidarity, of the shared principles and ethics of the struggle Inside and Outside, and thus of the Prisoners’ Movement—a quasi- complete loss of its culture, the root cause of which they attribute to Oslo. For Walid Daka, who from his position behind bars focuses his analysis on the role of Shabas, the al-Aqsa Intifada marked the beginning of this transformation. It is in reality the succession of these two periods that resulted in this situation. He describes the psychological malaise created by a material comfort that has progressively invisibilized the domination and violence of incarceration, and the difficulties in repositioning oneself vis-à-vis a new faceless carceral management:

“Despite a certain material comfort, one of the prisoners spontaneously and simply described the state of the prisoners’ values: “In the past, we were all together, now we are all against each other.” This sentence sums up the entire Palestinian political scene, but the contrast between relatively good living conditions and the feeling of a deterioration in morale comes primarily from the prisoners’ inability to identify the oppression they are facing. Because it does not appear to them directly in a brutal form, they cannot determine the means to oppose it.”

This malaise is also induced by the inability to renounce it due to the acute difference between the heroic figure of the prisoner and a political prison culture unchanged in national and societal representations and prison literature, and daily life in prison, where, according to Walid Daka, this culture almost no longer exists. A contradiction that is at the root of the powerlessness that detainees feel when seeking the means to resist this disintegration. Daka saw this in the lack of mobilization during the 2009 Gaza War, and in some prisoners’ tendency to focus on themselves or on activities far removed from national preoccupations. Sport and the long hours spent watching TV shows have eaten into the time used for political training, cultural activities, and reading, which previously constituted the central axis of prison socialization. According to him, the most-read books have become astrology, personal development books, and novels, and he interprets the multiplication of university courses strictly in the perspective of individual or professional mobility.

Tamer, Firas, and Sami. The al-Aqsa Generation and the Next: In-betweenness and the World of Networks Beyond Walls: Political Ruptures and Fragmentation

April 2010, I have an appointment with Fadia, whom I met shortly before in a lawyer’s office. Divorced, she is not adapting well to her release from prison, unable to meet her son’s needs, trapped in her family although she is now nearly forty years old. A nurse, she was incarcerated in 1999 because the ambulance she was in was transporting arms. She claims she had nothing to do with it, but was sentenced to three years. We have arranged to meet at Zyriab Café; she wanted to introduce me to one of her friends. Tamer, 24 years old, single, has picked up his Political Science studies at Birzeit University again following his release four months

every two months for security prisoners, Shabas reserving itself the right to grant them more often to certain people or groups.

According to Walid Daka, control by material comfort has developed as a means of shaping detainees' consciousness in an effort to mold a new generation of Palestinians. Managerial and neoliberal techniques of isolation, detainees' material improvements, and comfort have indeed been used to forge more individualistic, more passive, or even more powerless subjectivities vis-à-vis the new modalities of control; there where political prisoners had previously always constituted and represented a single collective body rooted in a nationalist militant prison culture.

With the modernization and construction of new carceral facilities, detention conditions rapidly changed in the prisons where over a dozen prisoners used to be crammed into cells and slept on mattresses on the floor. This was notably the case at Ofer, Ksiot, the new Hadarim wing (Section 3), and the recent Rimoinin building for minors, who had previously been detained in deplorable conditions above the Hasharon women's prison. The buildings of the US-style Hadarim wing are light, divided into quite spacious rooms fully equipped with TVs, DVD-players, fans, and hot and cold water fountains. Some wings have a kitchen and even a washing machine. They are designed so that the detainees can live there in independent wings and take charge of daily life as they see fit. This control by material comfort was first made available to all the factions' political leaders regrouped and collectively isolated in Section 3 of Hadarim, notably Marwan Barghouti of Fatah, Abdul Khaleq al-Natsheh of Hamas, Bassam al-Saadi of Islamic Jihad, Abdul Rahim Mallouh of the PFLP, and Mustafa Badarneh of the DFLP—all signatories of the Prisoners' Document, which they collectively wrote there.

The authorities sought to sway the prison leadership in this way or to encourage the emergence of another leadership aligned with the desires of the intelligence services, and in turn capable of influencing Palestinian society. The leaders were not however the only ones concerned, even if these amenities are far from being uniformly applied to all or in all establishments. The inequality of treatment toward certain people or groups, deliberately singled out by the prison services, is indeed another factor generating suspicion and dissension. It has helped elaborate a system of privileges that was previously virtually inexistant, and that is characteristic of total institutions, which, as Erving Goffman has shown, affects personalities by focusing attention on access to these advantages, while at the same time mentally and physically subjugating them to the prison staff (1979). Prison mobility, being moved closer to where their families live and access to studying at the Tel Aviv Open University are all leverage points in this system. For Shabas, university courses are not a right, but a privilege strictly conditioned by behavior. Authorization can be withdrawn at any time, even in the middle of a course, meaning that the year and the costly study fees are lost. Access, for that matter, requires significant financial means, not initially covered by the PA, which over time developed its own educational aid system for detainees. From being marginal and politically contested, higher education became highly demanded in this period and enrolments multiplied.

Finally, prison modernization was based on a new carceral technology that tends to invisibilize control and the deprivation of liberty by putting the detainees before faceless spaces and prison apparatuses, and less and less before guards. Here, the detainees now shut their own doors before the duty guard activates the centralized system to lock the hundred or so cell doors. Others live in an "independent" space without seeing guards, do their own laundry, and go "freely" about their daily occupations. Furthermore, these new technologies offer the added advantage of reducing detention costs in the logic of neoliberal economics. With Shabas' takeover of all prisons during Commissioner Ganot's mandate (2003–2007), the number of detainees doubled, rising from 12,000 to 24,000, while personnel rose from 3,800 to 7,000. The aim was to avoid an even more substantial increase in prison staff, to limit salary costs by allowing the employment of less trained, less qualified, and thus less well-paid people among the younger and more precarious fringes of the population, notably mobilizing a thousand young women and men doing their military service. This opened the door to a rapid and visible feminization of the guards, which changed the face and the perception of confinement.

Stretching over time, they forged their intellectual paths and long studies both Inside and Out, their intervals Outside allowing them to obtain their university qualifications. When I met Radi Jaraei in 2011, he was working at the Prisoners' Museum at Al-Quds University in Abu Dis and was teaching a class on the Prisoners' Movement in the Political Sciences department. A schoolteacher at the time of his first imprisonment from 1976 to 1985, he became a Fatah figure in detention, where he was in charge of the Culture Committee. He was released in May 1985 in what is known as the Ahmed Jibril prisoner exchange (tabadul Ahmed Jibril), negotiated by the leader of the PFLP-General Command, in which 1,270 Palestinian prisoners were released in exchange for three kidnapped Israeli soldiers. He then embarked on an International Relations BA at the University of Birzeit. Reincarcerated from 1987 to 1988, then from 1989 to 1991 for his involvement in the Intifada, he completed his BA, then his Master's in 2000, before at the age of over sixty years old undertaking a PhD by correspondence in an Egyptian university.

In Palestine, works on political prisoners' carceral socialization have shown the key role of political training in detention, just like in other contexts of political incarceration. Since 1967, Israeli prisons have constituted a "Palestinian university" (akadimieh filastinieeh) for both men and women, a foremost place of general education, political socialization, and militant training, with time divided between classes and debates separately dispensed by each party, and joint classes. This space, in which a "revolutionary pedagogy" developed, made culture, reading, and writing a means of mitigating the effects of incarceration, and of existing as Palestinians and as a political group. Political training was indeed highly structured within the parties. One former Fatah member who then joined Fatah al-Intifada in detention told me that this training comprised of three six-month levels (beginners—mubtadiyin; intermediary—sa'idin; and the final stage—takmili), at the end of which there were exams, and included classes, conferences, and practical works. At the end of the eighteen months, the students (talib—sing.) reached the level of leader (qa'id) and could thus write declarations, tracts, political texts, and so on.

Those with diplomas or specific skills and political experience shared their knowledge, whether to help the younger prisoners pass their high-school exams, university degrees, or climb the militant ranks. They taught English and Hebrew, but also—depending on their political orientation—human rights, women's rights, the history of political ideas, democracy, Marxism, the history of peoples under occupation, and later religious classes. The influence of Marxism was central in this training in the 1970s and 1980s. The parties of the left, the Communists, or those from the Arab Nationalist Movement played a major role, especially the PFLP, that was very present at the time in prison and in mobilizations Outside, alongside Fatah. Marxism offered a broad reflection that corresponded to the need to think an alternative and to impose a counter-model to prison's violence, while also connecting the Palestinians' revolutionary experience to that of the Chinese, the Cubans, the Vietnamese, and the Algerians. Some discovered the partisan world, while others shaped their convictions and moved from one party to another in contact with other people and discourses. Tarek recalls that his political ideas were not very firm when he first arrived in prison in 1980 at the age of eighteen:

"We had a specific program of studies, reading, and conferences. We would read political works that couldn't be found in the prison library. That took up the whole day; we didn't see the time pass. Those who had degrees or Master's or who knew languages taught the others. Many entered prison illiterate and left speaking two languages, and sometimes French, Russian, or German. They sent people to prison to break them psychologically, but it was like a family with its own rules. It wasn't a prison but a university. Learning, for Palestinians, is like breathing for lungs. I was in the party of Ahmed Jibril (PFLP-General Command). In prison, you read, you understand; I switched to Fatah. Many young people joined a party in prison. In prison, you have to be in a group; those who are independent, who are on their own, it's hard. What's more, our commissary money wasn't enough to buy the basic necessities. In the parties, we put everything we received together and there was a Minister of Finances who managed it. There was an equality between people. Those who were poor or who didn't have their family nearby, everyone received the same sum. It was a collective life, a socialist society [ishtiraki]."

Political prisoners indeed obtained the right to receive the sums their families sent for commissary on a common account, which the parties redistributed and managed equitably according to needs and to the organization of meals.

As the Prisoners' Movement gradually organized and managed the entire prison time, it became impossible not to join an organization on entering prison, and politicization was immediate. Initially, the army and prison services strongly opposed political detainees' internal organization and thus mixed them with Israeli common law prisoners. Once a separation was obtained by the men, then the women, they adopted the classing of detainees by party. They demanded that they choose one, while at the same time attempting to use this to influence militant activity behind bars and outside by creating dissensions, by opportunely transferring certain prisoners when prison elections were to be held, by transferring the most committed from prison to prison, and so on. Those with no affiliation were placed in the Fatah wing.

The 1980s are presented as the Golden Age of the Prisoners' Movement. The prison model was built on the world of writing, knowledge, and intellectual and textual production. The aim was to acquire knowledge and continue school or university trajectories, on the one hand, and thus to train an educated and militant generation capable of in turn teaching the next. On the other hand, the aim was to create and circulate a partisan literature constituting this carceral counter-model in the "Occupation prisons" (sujun al-ihlil) as they were most often called. Handbooks written by the different factions divulging interrogation techniques were thus intended to help face this ordeal, just as an array of other political, literary, and poetic texts were collectively written by prisoners during this period. These works, which more often than not have no identified author, asserted a carceral "we." Prison newspapers flourished. The educational process in itself helped transform consciences.

Despite the administration's censorship, detainees managed to constitute clandestine libraries reflecting their political colors. In the early 1970s, it was hard to have certain books, and notepads, pens, and Arabic newspapers brought into prison—and some prisons more so than others—firstly via the ICRC, then via families as of 1977. Moreover, every time there were tensions with the guards Inside, or when military actions or mobilizations flared up Outside, they were confiscated and prison rights suspended. Other books were smuggled in. In the 1980s, thanks to struggles and organizing in prison, prisoners gained access to a vaster literary world, which opened up the spaces of interconnection with the outside world.

We would get books from Ramleh prison, where the 48 and Jerusalemite Palestinian prisoners were held. We used to go there to the hospital. We would copy them in very small writing on shoe wrapping paper, on both sides. We would condense 100 pages into seven or eight, then roll them very tight and wrap them in plastic. They could be contained in seven kabsulat (kabsuleh-sing.) that we'd swallow [these little swallowed containers were—and to a lesser extent still are—a means of communication between prisons and with the parties outside]. Ramleh was a transfer center. In the room where people transited as they transferred from one prison to another, we exchanged the kabsulat, then we wrote them back out in exercise books to obtain a book. To avoid them being confiscated during searches, we'd take a hot hard-boiled egg, print the "authorized" stamp that was on other works on it, then copy it. Later, things changed. Families were allowed to bring eight books a month. 3,000 books were banned in the West Bank at the time. We used to change the cover and certain pages to get them through.

If this Golden Age is recalled with a nostalgia that has grown with the passing of time, the Prisoners' Movement, which was deeply rooted in the Occupied Territories, constituted a model when it united people from all parties whatever their political orientation and whether they came from different regions of Palestine and even Syria after the occupation of the Golan Heights. There was strict discipline, an invention of political, community-based, and alternative modes of education, resistance training, an egalitarian nationalist, socialist, and solidarity-based society: in other words, specific carceral citizenships and political practices that were more democratic and inclusive than those of the diaspora PLO leaders based in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, then in Tunis, before their return to Palestine after the Oslo Peace Accords in 1994 and 1995. The prison counter-model opposed its culture and values, its organization, to the rules and the moral economy of

intelligence division managed to permeate the workings of carceral citizenships, coopting many prison representatives, isolating, and pulverizing entire facets of prison culture. This intelligence division inside the prison system indeed prides itself on constituting a "unique model," whose mission is "managing dialogue and contact with the security prisoners." The processes seeking to smash the Palestinian national body developed mechanisms to individualize life in prison and to isolate detainees, not only from one another, but also vis-à-vis the Outside.

Premised on the PA's presence, the new Shabas regulations undermined communal rules and living. In the early 1980s, the parties and the Prisoners' Movement had collectivized the sums sent by families for commissary. Partisan representatives received the money and distributed it according to needs, while food was communally prepared in the kitchens. The PA, who took over the distribution of commissary funds in 2003, initially adopted this system by paying sums to just a few attributed prisoners. Shabas then demanded that the PA pay these monthly sums to everyone individually. Since 2007, distinct procedures have been added depending on status: Palestinian citizens of Israel, residents of Jerusalem, the Golan, and nationals from other Arab states are no longer allowed to receive this money directly. It is sent instead to their families, who give it to them, sometimes late, sometimes in part only, which has widened the gap in prison living conditions. Above all, however, it has transformed financial management and the communal preparation of meals, especially as, after losing control of the kitchens, detainees, who often refuse the food made by the Israeli common law prisoners whom they do not trust, installed electric hobs in their cells to cook food bought in commissary. Most of the time, however, people compensate for this inequality by sharing at cell level.

Since the failure of the 2004 strike, physical distance in the visiting rooms is now the rule; visits take place behind a window, communicating via intercom. Only children under the age of six (now under eight) were allowed to approach detainees, to embrace or kiss their fathers or mothers. Moreover, the individual or collective suspension of family visits has long been the most frequently used punitive measure. They are suspended in the event of a conflict in prison involving one or several detainees (a hunger strike, for example), or in the event of a change in the political and military situation Outside. During the First Intifada, visits were forbidden in all the prisons. During the Second Intifada, they were suspended again for everyone from 2000 to 2003.

The bans on visits were henceforth applied to distinct groups according to local, regional, and partisan criteria, again duplicating the fragmentation set in motion Outside according to a fractal logic. For Nablus families, a town where involvement in the armed struggle was widespread and repression long and violent, visits were only re-authorized again in 2007. Families from Gaza have been collectively deprived of visiting rights since Hamas took over and conjointly in response to the kidnapping of soldier Gilad Shalid in 2006. For Gaza families, the Israeli government for a time considered the idea—rejected by all the prisoners, even though some wives had unsuccessfully requested this—of making visits virtual by videocall. Gilad Shalit's release in 2011 did not automatically lead to the reintroduction of visits, however. They were progressively reestablished as of July 2012 following the major April–May 2012 hunger strike, albeit limited to only parents, spouses, and children under ten, and to only one visit every two months, not every fortnight like families' "normal" visiting rights in the West Bank.

The visiting regime progressively became governed by a system of privileges that has essentially broken up, and thus pulverized, the collective. After Hamas members' kidnapping and murder of three young settlers in the West Bank in June 2014, visits were suspended for everyone for a month and a half. They were instigated again first only for Fatah members, then, following a complaint filed by Israeli and Palestinian NGOs (HaMoked, Addameer), were restored for sympathizers of the other factions, but less often: once every two months, like for Gaza inhabitants. They were banned again in 2018 for Hamas detainees on account of the fact that the two Israeli nationals held in Gaza had no visiting rights, and as their exchange negotiations had come grinding to a halt. Following a court application, the prison services modified the regulation to be able to legally apply this kind of differentiation. Visits have since been officially allowed

initiative, partisan differences have long overlapped with the division of the wings. But with the scission between the PA in the West Bank and Hamas who took over in Gaza after the 2006 legislative elections, the prison and intelligence services adroitly fanned, then institutionalized the divisions by regrouping in separate wings the secular parties belonging to the PLO, on the one hand—Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP, and the Communists—and the religious parties, on the other—Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

With the exception of a few rapidly contained incidents, this fracture was instigated without triggering violence between prisoners who did not wish to be separated in this way. The partisan leaders imprisoned together at Hadarim on the contrary reacted first by refusing their food and threatening an open conflict with the administration if the separation between the religious parties and PLO were applied to them. Then, in 2006, they drew up the Prisoners' Document, which called for national unity and foregrounded their specific identity as prisoners in order to rally together in opposition to these scissions. The superposition of these two types of division accentuated the fragmentation; in Nafha prison, there is as a result now a Gaza PLO wing, a West Bank PLO wing, a Gaza Hamas (and Islamic Jihad) wing, and a West Bank Hamas wing. The women were transferred for a while into two different prisons: Hasharon for the religious parties, and Damon, further north, re-opened during the Intifada in 2001, for the rest.

Brigadier General Yuval Bitton, at present the Head of the Shabas Intelligence Division, was the mastermind behind this policy of collective pulverization. In 2018, when the Minister of Internal Security expressed the eventuality of no longer grouping together detainees by political faction, Yuval Bitton reiterated this intention during a conference at the Herzliya International Institute for Counter-Terrorism:

“between each of these groups sitting in jail there is a burning loathing and hatred. The internal Palestinian conflict serves our interests and we penetrate precisely these seams and cracks ... Our job is to deepen these ruptures, not to allow them to connect because when there is a common enemy, this is the factor that unifies the Palestinian people.”

This new spatial organization has been prolonged by dispositions aimed at breaking collective modes of representation and remodeling interactions with the administration. Here, as in other contexts of political incarceration, prison “attempts to individualize the detainees' engagement,” there, where on the contrary “within the collective, the erasure of the singular is fundamental”. Shabas failed to impose this new regulation everywhere and at all levels, but it did affect internal political organization. In each prison, the prison staff refused to interact with the General National Committee made up of the partisan organizations' elected representatives, or with the Administrative Committees nominated by them, or with the detainees' representatives, the only ones habilitated to liaise with it. They only interacted with the new spokesmen of the different regions regrouped in sections, whom the prison services chose from the few names put forward by the prisoners. The administration imposed that they met the guards individually, only relayed their section's requests, and quasi-exclusively personal requests, thereby instigating differentiated living conditions.

The maintaining of collective punishments for individual violations, on the other hand, led detainees to mutually control one another. Walid Daka also describes the banning of all forms of collective celebration of arrivals, departures, deaths of friends or relatives, speeches mentioning the situation in Palestine during Friday sermons, and any national images in cells. Moreover, a policy of constant transfers was instigated to prevent democratic practices within the Prisoners' Movement, to undermine carceral citizenships, and to influence the results of internal elections by opportunely displacing people. This also maintained them in a state of permanent instability in order to undermine morale and determination, to disorientate, and to psychologically isolate particularly those considered too active.

Isolating Prisoners, Individualizing Daily Life, Breaking Prison Culture: Toward a Neoliberal Subjectivation

By playing on perpetual change, which perturbs and makes it harder to adapt, and on individual emulation, by employing managerial techniques typical of the neoliberal doxa and exacerbating division, the Shabas

the prison services and the army, and permeated the political realm and society Outside. In this sense, and in that period, prison failed to constitute a completely total institution in the Goffmanian sense. While militant trajectories, the toing-and-froing between the Inside and Outside, and the simultaneous political organization in Israeli prisons and in the Territories suggest a reciprocal fecundation between these two universes, for this generation of the Prisoners' Movement and for that of the Intifada, the prison model predominated. It constituted the main mode of citizenship. For the national movement, prison thus became, as Ismail Nashif analyzes it, a rite of passage to Palestinian identity (2004/2005). Its unitary and trans-partisan structure prefigured that of the First Intifada and, along with the PNF, constituted a model for its Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), in which the Prisoners' Movement participated.

Abu George and Qaddura Farès. The Intifada Generation and the Politicization of the Hunger Strike (1988–1994) Protest Beyond Walls. The Massification and Violence of Imprisonment

The Prisoners' Movement, which grew in strength throughout the 1980s, reached its apogee during the First Intifada (1987–1993). In February 1988, many of the Popular Committee and Unified National Leadership (UNLU) cadres were arrested. Most of the UNLU decisions were thus taken in prison in constant dialogue with the Outside.

This was also the case with the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the religious movement, which truly entered into active resistance during the Intifada. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood had already served time in Israeli prisons in the 1980s, for example, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who founded Hamas in 1987. A revolutionary Islamic branch also developed in detention, drawing on both religious branches and Fatah, and even left-wing parties, notably those with active armed factions. The first operations carried out by the different groups claiming allegiance to Islamic Jihad began in the 1980s, and this branch gradually became more present in detention. At the end of the summer of 1988, the West Bank members of the High Council of the Muslim Brotherhood and leaders of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), and the military leaders in Gaza were arrested. As a result, the Hamas leadership reorganized in prison and continued its action in liaison with Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who remained free until May 1989 when he was imprisoned again, along with all the members of the new leadership and over 250 partisans.

The Prisoners' Movement's preponderant role stemmed from the fact that “all the major leaders were in prison, unlike today, where it is chaos (fawda), where anybody and everybody ends up in prison, which has weakened the Movement.” I met Abu George in Nablus in 2012. He described himself as a high-ranking Fatah official, a director general in the Palestinian Authority administration, and a lecturer at al-Quds Open University in Abu Dis, Birzeit University in Ramallah, and an-Najah University in Nablus. He was sturdy, with imposing gestures, performing a cocksure masculinity accentuated by his national role. He was forty-something at the time. He had been periodically preventatively arrested since 1985 when he was fourteen, and a volunteer in the town's Fatah-affiliated social work youth committee.

“We used to clean the streets, the graves in the cemetery. Fatah was banned; it was a secret organization. The Israelis began putting pressure on before the First Intifada. I spent sixteen Eid celebrations in a row in prison. It wasn't the army who came to get me, but the intelligence services [mukhabarat]. When I was at friends' houses, they would sometimes ring the bell to show us that we were being watched, surveilled. I then did five years during the First Intifada from 1989 to 1993. I'm not lying when I tell you that I was happier; it was a school, a university, a castle. There, I learned Hebrew, English, the history of world revolutions. We understood the other factions [fasayl] better, the PFLP, the DFLP... The First Intifada was a lot better than the Second; it was a popular resistance [muqawameh sha'biyeh]. There were no arms. I ended up in Hadassah hospital [in West Jerusalem] three times following the torture I was subjected to in interrogation, but I did not confess. Even for the choice of cells, I didn't tell [the administration] I was Fatah, otherwise I'd have been sent straight back to court. I spent most of the time in Tulkarem prison. There were only about forty of us. It was a hellhole, very harsh, it's well-known. It wasn't like the main prisons. Three men died

during torture in this prison [housing an interrogation center]. It was Druze border guards who were responsible for these deaths. This prison was on two underground floors. Later, they shut it down. We went on hunger strike for twenty-one days in Tulkarem and we got good results: radios, newspapers, cigarettes, we were able to see our mothers with no physical separation. Whatever happened, they punished me. I was put in solitary confinement for a year and a half. I passed my high school exams before being arrested; I started studying again in Egypt in 1993—psychology—and I went all the way to PhD level, which I completed in 2005. It was in prison that I became interested in psychology. When Arafat returned to Palestine [when the Palestinian Authority was created], I was working in Ramallah for six months and spent the other six months in Egypt for my studies. The final year, I was transferred to Naqab prison [also known as Ansar 3 to the Palestinians, and as Ketziot to the Israeli authorities]. Family visits had been banned from the start, only lawyers could visit, but that changed after the massive 1992 hunger strike; all the prisoners went on strike in all the prisons, but it took a very long time to obtain that.”

Naqab prison in the Negev desert near the Egyptian border, which was an army-run camp where the men were housed in tents, was opened in 1988 to handle the tens of thousands of people who were put in detention at that time. 50,000 people were held there between 1988 and 1995, when approximately 110,000 people were imprisoned over the course of the First Intifada. During the uprising, Popular Committees were set up all over the territory. An entire civilian population—youths, women, and men—stood up to the occupier and responded to the calls to action made by the secular parties’ unified command (UNLU) by demonstrating, striking massively in all sectors of activity, boycotting taxes and the Israeli economy, creating alternative networks and modes of production, organizing homeschooling and alternative universities to compensate for the closures, and so on.

The politics of mass incarceration intensified and was asserted as such. The “all-out carceral,” or penal “big government,” to borrow Loïc Wacquant’s terms used in reference to US prisons in the 1980s, was veritably put in place with the mass arrests of the First Intifada (1987–1993), which began in the very first two months in an effort to quell the uprising. On average, 25,000 people were arrested a year, and in November 1989, the prison population reached its maximum of approximately 13,000 detainees. In 1989, according to Human Rights Watch, this rate was of the order of 750 prisoners for every 100,000 people, in other words, the highest in the world. Administrative detentions multiplied; they also affected women and minors, and their duration again became longer. Over 14,000 were pronounced between 1987 and 1992. Others were arrested for varying periods in an attempt to obtain information. Some ended up in detention camps for days or months without trial or even an administrative detention order. The secret detention center known as Camp 1391 was set up; people disappeared, held there in total isolation. Repression affected the entire population, even if it particularly targeted young men for motives ranging from handing out tracts to activities within a Popular Committee, building barricades, writing graffiti, or throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. It became increasingly brutal. The then Defense Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, gave the order to break Palestinians’ arms and legs. The Landau Commission encouraged the use of torture in interrogations. In the same period, the prison regime intensified; family visits were suspended—at Ketziot, the ban lasted five years (1988–1992)—and it was no longer possible to take high-school exams.

The internal political and cultural order was not shaken by the simultaneous arrival in prison of an influx of young, or even very young men. Depending on the facility, some organized among themselves, whereas many, like Abu George, had already undergone prison socialization in the preceding period, which contributed to this Intifada generation’s training. Others were taken in by the older partisan leaders who had remained behind bars or been re-arrested, like Radi Jaraci, Qaddura Fares, or Ahmad Saadat. The culture and values of the political prisoners predominated. It was “one single society,” Qaddura Fares, an influential Fatah official close to Marwan Barghouti, told me. From prison, he and Issa Qaraq initiated the creation of the Prisoners’ Club (Nadi al-Asir) in 1992. On release, he became its president from 1994 to 1996, then again from 2006 to the present. He spent fourteen years in detention (1980–1994) before being elected a deputy in 1996.

prison values. It marked consciences and demoralized. Many criticized the Strike Committee’s strategy. It firstly decided to focus on the localized demands of each penitentiary, although the prisons in the north, and particularly Hadarim, were more united than those of the south, where the three prisons designated to lead the movement—namely Eshel (Beer-Sheva), Nafha and Asqalan—were located. Secondly, it did not strictly follow the initial directives, even though the administration had cut the strikers’ main channels of communication. The leaders decided to stop the movement too soon; they thought that the men, 80% of whom were newly incarcerated youth, would not continue for long. Finally, they failed to stop partisan competition for the leadership of the movement from undermining collective solidarity and, in fine, failed to create the conditions to resist the pressure exerted by Shabas.

None of the requests were met and the strike even represented a regression with the definitive loss of major gains. The security detainees lost charge of preparing and organizing the kitchens and maintenance work, which was given to common law prisoners in all the prison facilities, where a minima a common law prisoners’ wing was reestablished (with the exception of Ofer, due to its location in the West Bank). Hitherto possible via the inmates delivering food, the circulation of information was severely disrupted, as were effective control, and collective organization.

The new prison management was thus more easily instigated. The collective isolation measures and watertight separation between the prisons’ different wings that had started to be put in place—and to which this strike was opposed—were strengthened. The prisons were henceforth hermetically divided into wings (qassem) of about 120 prisoners, and sometimes even into cells. Circulation and communication between these wings were prevented, exercise and visiting times separated, and the role of the representatives of these smaller units enhanced. Shabas strove to separate them according to status and geographic and social identities, and to individualize daily life behind bars. The regrouping of prisoners inside reflected the spatial fragmentation and isolation in the Occupied Territories. In addition to the compartmentalization and general restriction of movement came the more frequent use of punitive measures isolating groups (collective isolation) and persons (solitary confinement) for long periods. Most of the partisan leaders were thus isolated from the others and grouped together in Section 3 of Hadarim prison. This section can hold up to 120 detainees in forty cells that house three inmates. In 2014, seventy Fatah members were held there, including Marwan Barghouti who has been there since 2005 and the veteran prisoner Karim Younis; twenty-five Hamas affiliates; twenty Islamic Jihad activists; and seven PFLP and DFLP members.

In addition to the time-old play on partisan divisions, distinctions were introduced according to the detainees’ place of residence, and to types of citizenship based on the territorial fragmentation of the Occupied Territories: Palestinian citizens of Israel, Jerusalemite Palestinians, Syrians from the Golan, West Bank Palestinians, or again Gaza Palestinians. For years, detainees from the Gaza Strip were habitually imprisoned in facilities in southern Israel: Ketziot (al-Naqab), Ramon, Nafah, Eshel (formerly Beer-Sheva prison), Ohalei Keidar, and Shikma (Asqalan). The 48-Palestinians, citizens of Israel, Jerusalemites, and Golan prisoners were treated in the same way and separated from the others again when that had no longer been the case since 1976. Above all, they were subdivided again into separate wings or cells according to even smaller scales of geographic origin, status, and belongings, thereby reinforcing the pre-national solidarities and interests against which the national movement built itself. Town residents were separated from the refugees of the camps they were home to (Jenin camp, Balata camp in Nablus, etc.), and those from one town from those from another, thereby fanning local particularisms and at times rivalry between places and cities (Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Hebron, etc.) that were increasingly isolated from one another by the Israeli system of control. At times, villages and even families were separated. In the men’s prisons, they were physically separated from the other detainees. Far fewer in number, the women have managed to resist this compartmentalization.

In addition to its three common law wings, there are now four security wings at Gilboa prison: one regrouping the Palestinian citizens of Israel, Jerusalemites, and Golan residents; one those from Gaza; a third, those from Hebron and Nablus; and a fourth where West Bank Palestinians are held. At the detainees’

by a third, which is rarely granted to security detainees. He has done the rounds of all the prison facilities. He has above all spent time in Hadarim, Gilboa, and Nafha, where Israeli Palestinians are most often regrouped, along with those from Jerusalem and Golan Syrians, two territories officially annexed by the State of Israel in 1980 and 1981, respectively. He publishes texts in collective works and in the press, notably in *Fasl al-Maqal*, the newspaper of the *Tajamu'*, a party he is close to. He obtained his Master's in Political Sciences at the Tel Aviv Open University while in prison. He teaches in detention a lot and supervises his co-detainees' university studies. He has inspired exhibitions and the play *A Parallel Time*, which provoked an outcry in Israel because it presents Walid Daka and his cell companions' human experience when they are usually portrayed as monstrous terrorists. When I met Sana again in October 2014, he was working on two books—one in Hebrew and the other in Arabic—for the publishing house of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies run by Azmi Bishara.

In *Consciousness Molded or the Re-Identification of Torture*, a 2009 text inspired by Naomi Klein's shock doctrine, he analyzes the violent shock that Operation Defensive Shield (2002) and its aftermath represented, then the failure of the 2004 hunger strike as means used by the Israeli authorities to "shape consciousness," in the words of the Military Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon. Walid Daka describes the measures deployed to break the political prisoners' organization and collective values, which were avant-garde in the militant and nationalist struggle, in an attempt to destroy the foundations and political resistance of Palestinian society. He considers prison to be a laboratory for policies instigated in the Territories. Above all, he highlights the parallels between Inside and Outside in the mechanisms used to separate Palestinians from one another, to fragment, isolate, and individualize. The aim have been indeed no longer to break Palestinian bones, but rather to change mindsets by working on the production of subjectivities both Inside and Outside. A fractalization of the modes of control and government of the Palestinians can be noted; that is, they are reproduced according to similar modalities in different places and on different scales.

The determining event that changed the course of prison management was the brutal ordeal of the August 2004 hunger strike. It was triggered—intentionally, according to Walid Daka—by the arbitrary, humiliating, and coercive measures taken by the new Shabas Director, Yaakov Ganot, in 2003: notably incessant sniffer-dog searches of prisoners and their cells, and the installation of glass windows and intercoms in the visiting rooms to prevent any physical contact with their families. Previously, the mesh grills at least allowed prisoners to put their hands through to touch their loved ones. The detainees were driven into launching an open-ended strike even though most of them, who were new to prison, lacked experience. This strike took place at the time that the army was repressing the Intifada and as Yasser Arafat and the Territories were besieged. It could not really receive backing from Outside. It lasted between eighteen and twenty-six days, depending on the people and places. It remains in prison memory the darkest of strikes. Yet it was the first time that all the parties agreed on its necessity and that Hamas decided to take part in a hunger strike. It was observed by over 70% of the prisoners. Like Walid Daka, Seitan Al-Uli has described a highly organized repression on the part of Shabas and an unprecedented determination not to cede, backed by the Likoud Minister of Internal Security, Tzahi Hanegbi, with the intention not only of breaking the strike, but also the leadership. Salt—an ingredient needed to retain body fluids—was taken away. The strikers were force fed, lights were left on day and night, searches were incessant. In order to break the channels of transmission of information and to break their morale, the strikers were transferred, the leaders isolated, and visits from families and lawyers suspended. Cut off from the outside world, they were subjected to loudspeaker broadcasts of false information and rumors about the leaders "merrily eating chocolates," or about Hamas' intention to take political advantage of the movement, and to guards who taunted them by organizing barbecues in the yard.

It was a patent failure and had long-term repercussions. It revealed the Prisoners' Movement' organizational weakness, as the strike ended chaotically, individually, without coordination and collective decision-making. While this rout was recognized as being caused by the authorities' head-on confrontational strategy, it discredited a leadership on the wane since Oslo and proved to all the weakening of collective

"Our values were honesty [al-sadq]—whereas today, lying has become a way of doing politics, a tactic—and altruism [al-ithar]. Our organization was socialist. Everything that entered prison—money from the families for commissary, from the Red Cross—was entirely collectivized and shared among us. There were no big [kabir] or little people [daghbir], people who drove around in BMWs and others who walked. Those in charge, the leaders, had to take their turn at cleaning and washing up just like everyone else."

A real carceral democracy existed, dotted with regular elections that were kept secret so that they could be held without prisoners being transferred or interventions on the part of the administration, or retaliation measures against those elected. A trace of regret for an idealized era of political discipline and faultless cohesion and solidarity was detectable in his words. Abu George's account expressed this pride in belonging to this solidary, militant, and nationalist collective body. Like other men or women not broken by the prison experience and interrogation, he expressed this nostalgia for a Golden Age of militantism Outside and of life behind bars, despite its terrible brutality. Others do not wish to talk publicly about it, as it is hard politically and psychologically to reconcile the ferocity of prison with this sentiment as Samir told me:

"I don't want to talk only about the past. Nowadays, all the parties have become tainted in prison, not just Fatah, even if it is less so with the PFLP and Hamas. We wanted to build a republic like Platon's, and Palestine is the worst of the Arab countries. You shouldn't write this, but my experience was beautiful: we learned languages, lots of things, we only lacked time."

This paradoxical sentiment is, however, common in other even harsher contexts of political incarceration, such as that of the Syrian prisons in the 1980s, as described by Yassin al-Haj Saleh.

In his testimony, and in his braggart manner, Abu George described the sacred heroic national figure that the political prisoner became in that era. He exalted masculine bravura, combatant honor, heroism, and egos measured by their capacity to resist repression. For Said al-Atabeh, who spent thirty-two years in prison from the age of twenty-five to almost sixty (1977–2008), this figure of the hero—albeit less performed—also imposed itself on him: "When you think of having spent thirty years in prison, you become a stranger to even yourself, a hero. It's a miracle to have spent so many years in prison and to still be able to discuss politics, the economy, and to get married." Political prisoners are often compared to "knights" (*fursan*). *Knights of the City* (*Fursan al-madina*) is the title of a short story written by Yunis Rjoub; *The Generals of Patience. Knights Behind Bars* (*Generaliat al-saber. Fursan khalf al-Qudban*) that of a recent collective work written by incarcerated personalities, including the former Minister of Prisoners' Affairs, Issa Qaraq, who, during his time behind bars, was their general representative. They are also called "caged lions," or lion cubs (*ashbal*) for the youth, thereby conjuring all the noble and combative attributes of the lion, to which is opposed the dog, used in this text to describe the guards, interrogators, and Israeli soldiers. In this work, the imprisoned Hamas leader Abdel Khaleq al-Natsheh describes prisoners as the "guardians of the nation, of the people, and of all the Ummah."

The Hunger Strike as a Test. Act I

From the very beginning of the Occupation, hunger strikes became the prime repertoire of action during prison mobilizations. This nonviolent mode of action restores a capacity to dissent in a prison context of intense coercion and the confinement of bodies, and has often been deployed by political detainees in Europe and elsewhere since the late nineteenth century. It extracts bodies from the relationship of domination and re-signifies the violence inflicted upon them by investing it with a chosen political meaning. Some of these strikes were more specifically tests in the sense of the power struggles that Bruno Latour identifies in *épreuves*; they were moments of rupture in which the stakes were redefined.

Always connected to the need to improve prison conditions, they initially, for both the men and women prisoners, sought to transform the way of characterizing the situation, and prison relations, and thus to establish what Ismail Nashif calls a counter-order. Their aim was to have their status as political detainees recognized, at least in practice, by being separated from the Israeli common law prisoners and gaining the

possibility to organize their existence. In the early 1980s, political connections and solidarity between the Inside and Outside intensified; the hunger strikes gained resonance and backing in the Territories. Later, they multiplied in the attempt to gain rights and better detention conditions, each strike bringing its array of improvements:

“The 1977 Asqalan strike got us real mattresses. With the 1980 Nafha strike, in which two men died [Rasim Halaweh and Ali Al-Ja’fari, following their forced feeding], we progressed from mattresses to beds. Observed in several prisons, the 1984 strike got us radios, authorization to have civilian clothes sent to us, and the reduction of the number of people in the cells, then that of 1985 was to get televisions. In 1987, the Jneid strike was launched against the head of the prison services [Commander David Maimon] who instigated a highly repressive policy for eleven months. We managed to obtain his departure.”

In the early 1990s, they became tests of strength not only vis-à-vis the prison services and the army, but also within the national movement and vis-à-vis the parties and the PLO abroad. In addition to the demands concerning the daily conditions of prison life, the 1992 strike thus marked the heightened politicization of these confrontations.

Qaddura Fares was among those incarcerated before the start of the Intifada, and who took on the role of leader when it broke out when he was twenty-six years old and was supervising daily life and struggles in detention. At the age of thirty, he was the leader (mumathil al-'am) in Jneid prison in Nablus at the time of the major 1992 hunger strike as he had seniority, was a good orator, was respected, spoke Hebrew, and belonged to Fatah, which was in the majority in Jneid, as it was in all the establishments. From inside Jneid where the movement started, he was the main leader of this strike of an unprecedented scale that all the prisons took part in and nearly all of the almost 11,000 detainees. It lasted sixteen days, from September 27 to October 14.

During a strike, a secret committee is put in charge of strategy (the Strategic Committee—*lajneh al-stratijia*). It determines when the strike begins and ends, how the confrontation takes place, attributes responsibilities, roles, the often rolling temporality of the groups' going on strike, and its priorities, in coordination with the Committees in each prison. The strike's official Coordination Committee (designated internally as the Combat Committee—*lajneh al-nidalijeh*) is responsible for the daily decisions, for negotiating, for writing, and circulating communiqués destined for the Outside. Support and a public, including the press, is indeed sought in organizing a hunger strike. Communications and public and unofficial interactions with the Outside seek to federate a common political struggle beyond the walls. Its objectives are borne by the prisons which are designated the decision-makers in the strike. In 1992, Jneid was the main prison in charge. Meticulously prepared in advance, benefitting from decades of experience in staging hunger strikes and from the strength of the Prisoners' Movement, the 1992 strike was considered victorious. It achieved most of the demands to improve detention conditions: better quality food; sufficient basic necessities and cleaning products; an end to the policy of systematic solitary confinement instigated since the beginning of the Intifada; the right to visits at Ktziot (Naqab) and an increase in their duration elsewhere (from thirty to forty-five minutes); the possibility of following a university course by correspondence—which was nonetheless limited to the Tel Aviv Open University, when what had been demanded was the right to enroll in the Palestinian universities. This strike, which went down in memory, was a landmark for the Prisoners' Movement. The conflict was resolved by the Internal Security Minister, Moshe Shahal, who talked directly to the Coordination Committee, bypassing the prison authorities, who were overwhelmed by a growing movement. They indeed feared deaths as they did not have sufficient resources to handle the situation and to guarantee the health of so many detainees. Moreover, this strike was relayed Outside by increasing demonstrations and protest marches, sit-ins, and solidary hunger strikes by mothers of prisoners in Jerusalem, Nablus, Bethlehem, and Gaza, and mediatized by an incandescent Palestinian and Israeli press. It rekindled an Intifada that had been running out of steam.

It was one of the events of the Intifada that took place at the time when the uprising, but also the peace talks that had begun at the Madrid Conference in October 1991 were faltering, and Yitzhak Rabin, the man

are allowed no authorized exits, their daily movements are more closely monitored, they are the object of regular reports that the prison's intelligence service makes to the police and the Shin Bet, and they are subjected to a whole host of individual and collective punitive measures. With a view to managerial efficiency, this categorization is above all intended to facilitate the running of prison facilities by regrouping a type of prisoner (adult and minor) who is considered unlikely to change and to be rehabilitated, and who has almost no access to social services or sentence adjustments or parole.

The management of security prisoners by Shabas has contributed to ratifying the annexation of the West Bank, to erasing the borders with Israel, and to the control of the Gaza Strip. It denies detainees the rights inherent to civilians in a context of occupation, infringing the provisions of the 4th Geneva Convention, according to which occupied populations must remain on their own territory, while at the same time not granting them that relating to prisoners of war as defined in the 3rd Convention, thereby rendering Palestinian detainees' judicial status indeterminate.

In Israel, placing the military prisons under Shabas control was publicly justified by its professional competence and its ability to better manage this number of prisoners; in the aim of modernizing and building new prisons; in the humanitarian motive of improving detention conditions; and by the need to end the exception that the military prison system constituted. However, other logics were at play: at the time run by Avi Dichter, who became the Minister of Internal Security in 2006, the intelligence services played a key role. They officially became members of the Shabas Executive Board, allowing them to fully participate in decisions. They inspired a new prison management of political prisoners instigated in 2003/2004 onwards. This unprecedented political rationale of prison management had an economic side to it, in the quest for a greater cost-efficiency capable of sustaining an all-out prison system while at the same time reducing its cost in a neoliberal perspective. The humanitarian discourse that went with this new carceral politics contributed to reformulating the modalities of the Occupation, masking the violence of its control mechanisms and humanizing them—or at least appearing to. This approach, known as “humanitarianism” or “strategic humanitarianism,” developed strongly in the army and the Shin Bet as of the early 2000s, based on programs such as “Another Life”. The integration of a humanitarian discourse and certain practices and thus, accordingly, of an opposition to the Occupation—that represented by many of the NGOs and Israeli activists who demand the minimum respect of Palestinian rights—facilitated the reformulation of control. The goal was to make the all-carceral less costly in political terms by normalizing it, just like other central mechanisms of the Occupation, such as checkpoints. The “checkpoint ‘civilization’” at the so-called border—that is, along the Wall—where checkpoints have been transformed into “crossing points” resembling airport terminals, and their privatization and use of a service vocabulary in their functioning, have, indeed, participated in this.

In the words of the military experts, the aim, then, was to invisibilize the Occupation in the eyes of Israeli society and the international community. These mechanisms of control have been made “softer,” less ostensibly violent, and thus more acceptable politically. Making them commonplace has made them more easily entrenched.

2004. The Hunger Strike as a Test. Act II. The Fractalization of Control and Fragmenting of the Collective

Walid Daka is a prison intellectual. He was born in 1961. He has been living behind bars for over thirty years, in what he described on a card that his wife, Sana, gave to me in April 2010 as a “parallel time”—that of before the fall of the communist bloc, the first Gulf War, Arab satellite channels, cell phones, and the internet. He was sentenced to life in prison for his participation in the kidnapping and murder of soldier Moshe Tamam. He was imprisoned in 1986 at the age of twenty-four. He is an Israeli citizen and, because of this, has not been released in any of the political exchanges and releases. In 2012, his sentence was commuted to thirty-seven years in detention. Since, his lawyer Mikhail Sfar has requested that it be reduced

particularly in the West Bank. Mass incarceration took off again. It was nonetheless accompanied by the systematic elimination of the uprising's political and military leaders through targeted assassinations. In Gaza, bombardments and assassinations were favored over incarceration. With the unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005 (the complete withdrawal of settlers and the army), the Israeli authorities had less possibility of arresting the inhabitants of Gaza, accentuating the difference of treatment with the West Bank. Since, Gazan detainees have never represented more than 15% of all political prisoners. Many have served their sentences and others were released in the Shalit exchange at the end of 2011. Around 100 among the Gazan detainees were incarcerated before 2005. Their number stood at 200 on July 14, 2022, that is, less than 5% of the total number of prisoners.

Seriously undermined by the Oslo period, prison leadership found itself facing the massive influx of a new generation, some with no partisan background, and with distinct mentalities and political culture; they struggled to integrate them while, at the same time, few elders were still behind bars and the major al-Aqsa Intifada leaders were not sent to prison but mostly killed. Moreover, contrary to the First, this uprising had no unified command. Only intermediate leaders and those wanted for their at times chaotic participation in the Intifada found themselves in prison. With the opening of new prisons, the longest-standing detainees were dispersed to stop them training new prisoners, while others did not sufficiently take the measure of the role they should have played vis-à-vis the young arrivals. This breakdown in generational transmission and lack of guidance accelerated the weakening of the Prisoners' Movement.

With the Intifada, the Israeli-Palestinian coordination established by Oslo imploded. The principles of new penology penetrated the Israeli prison system, in which the role of the intelligence services (the Shin Bet and the Prison Intelligence Division) became ever more pervasive over time. This new penology is indeed based on risk management, preventative detention, and mass surveillance. It aims to neutralize, rather than to transform or rehabilitate people considered dangerous. It is, in this sense, post-disciplinary.

From 2,085 people in April 1999, the number of those detained by the army or Shabas reached over 9,000 in 2006–2007. Between October 2000 and November 2009, 69,000 Palestinians were imprisoned.

In 2002, Naqab prison (Ktsiot) was re-opened to manage the flood of arrests, and the Ofer military camp was created in Betunia, near Ramallah. In southern Israel, the new Ramon prison—an extension of Nafha prison—opened its doors in 2006. Other recent facilities housed the security detainees (Hadarim, inaugurated in 1999, or Jalbu'a—Gilboa—in 2004), while older prisons were modernized in this period when the entire penitentiary policy toward the Palestinians was being restructured.

With the Oslo Accords, all the army-run Israeli prisons in the West Bank and Gaza were relocated with the others inside Israel's pre-1967 borders. Only the new Ofer prison remained in Area C of the West Bank. This transfer above all concerned the men's prisons, women having already been incarcerated inside Israel for longer. Furthermore, these establishments were integrated into Israel's civilian prison system (Shabas) under the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Security. Begun in 2002–2003, this integration of the Occupied Territories' security prisons and prisoners into Shabas' fold was completed in 2009.

The integration into Israel's prison system formalized the ethno-national (Palestinian and Arab) dimension of the security prisoner category. The detention rights and duties it implied were defined by Shabas regulations, albeit without them formally becoming a legal provision. It was a question of distinguishing them from the common law prisoners with whom they often now cohabited in the same facilities. In 2007, security detainees represented 45% of all prisoners. The decision to classify a detainee in the "security prisoner" category is the responsibility of the prison warden and the prison's internal intelligence service after consultation of their legal file and in coordination with the Shin Bet. It entails drastically limited rights, which are regularly curtailed depending on the Israeli/Palestinian political situation: visits have remained limited to the immediate family since 1996 (parents, children, spouses, siblings), and their number is limited to a visit a fortnight. Since 2004, they imperatively take place behind a glass window, speaking through the intercom. Detainees have no telephone access, except in the event of a family death when one fifteen-minute call is allowed (this has since changed following the May 2019 hunger strike). They

to whom the brutal repression of the Intifada was imputed, was forming a government in July 1992. Also, it was important for the prison leadership, which was also that of inside the Occupied Territories, to make its voice heard and to exert pressure on the PLO leaders based in Tunis, who were covertly negotiating a solution to the conflict in Oslo while the Palestinian delegation sent to Madrid from the Occupied Territories was marginalized. It was followed by the June 1994 strike, which more clearly still, expressed the power struggle at play within the national movement. In direct contact with the situation on the ground in the Territories, experienced in Israeli political culture, able to speak Hebrew, and knowing the practices of the army and intelligence services officers, the imprisoned leaders and those who were free in the West Bank and Gaza considered themselves more capable of negotiating with the Israeli authorities than the leaders of the PLO, socialized outside Palestine. The content of the Oslo peace accords was contested by the political figures of the OPT in the Madrid delegation, such as Haidar Abdel Shafi. They notably had demanded the complete cessation of colonization, which was not mentioned in the Oslo Accords. They moreover rejected the accords' deferred ruling on the central questions of Jerusalem and refugees. The Inside leadership—that of the prisoners—furthermore considered that the prisoners' social and political place was not reflected in the September 13, 1993, declaration of principle signed by the Israeli government and the PLO, which made no reference to their situation. It was not reflected in the Cairo agreement of 1994 (Oslo I) either, which only promised the release of 5,000 out of a total of 7,170 prisoners, and only addressed the question from the non-binding perspective of "confidence-building measures," which enabled the Israeli authorities to determine the rhythm and the criteria of release.

Hassan and Ahmad. Oslo, a Generation in the Shadows (1994–1999) The Marginalization of the Prisoners

With the Oslo Accords, the prison leaders were no longer the major political actors in the Territories. They found themselves subordinated to the PLO leaders abroad for decisions concerning them and for the releases that were supposed to take place in the wake of the peace process. "It was extremely painful for them," Shawan Jabarin explains. "They were aware that they were no longer the most important political actors. It was as if the prisoners had become a humanitarian issue, and no longer a political question."

The Inside/Outside dialectic had changed. The Prisoners' Movement as a collective body was weakened in part because it had lost its function, but also because releases created a divide between those who backed the peace process and those who were against it and found themselves relegated to the opposition and thus less likely to be let out. While the local Fatah leaders had promised everyone's imminent release, of the 5,300 released in early 1995, most belonged to Fatah or to formations having approved the Oslo compromise.⁴² Only a few hundred belonged to the left-wing opposition forces (the PFLP and DFLP), about 1,000 of whom remained in prison, or to the Islamic movements (Islamic Jihad and Hamas). Hamas declared 1,800 detainees, 1,000 of whom were incarcerated after signing of the Accords. Unlike Fatah members, those belonging to the opposition factions had to sign a letter agreeing to renounce all forms of resistance, or—in the Israeli authorities' view—terrorist activity. In addition to their political affiliations, the negotiations took into account detainees' place of residence and citizenship. The Israeli authorities excluded Palestinian citizens of Israel from the discussions and were reticent about including Jerusalemites, thereby creating additional divisions within the community of prisoners. Some refused to sign this statement, others refused their release in solidarity. The women opposed one female prisoner's maintenance in detention until they were victorious. Nonetheless, despite the critiques leveled at these negotiations, in early 1997, not a single woman was still behind bars, and only 350 men who were already detained before Oslo remained in prison; they became known as the elders (qudama).

The prisons emptied and the large Naqab (Ktsiot) military detention camp was closed in 1995. They had nonetheless taken in new detainees during the peace process period: between 1,000 and 2,000 arrests a year. Many were administrative detainees, held simply due to their or their parties' opposition to the Accords. That

was the case of Shawan Jabarin, the current head of the Palestinian NGO al-Haq, accused of belonging to the PFLP and imprisoned at Jneid from 1994 to 1995, or of Najeh Assi, at the time a young militant in the Islamic group at Birzeit University, who was detained several times from 1994 to 1997, then convicted for his student political activities. Others were involved in individual armed actions, or in the wave of attacks and suicide attacks—known as martyrdom operations (*‘ameliyeh istishadiyeh*—sing.) in Palestinian society and political parties—undertaken by the Islamic parties from 1994 to 1997 in retaliation for extremist Jewish settler Baruch Goldstein’s massacre of worshipers praying in Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron on February 25, 1994.

More massively incarcerated since the Intifada, the prisons saw an influx of Islamic party members as attacks were perpetuated one after the other and the failure of the Accords became apparent. Along with the left-wing opposition, and primarily the PFLP, they constituted the Oslo prison generation, which grew in the shadows of the peace process, rapidly proving that the process did not have what it would take to succeed. In this period only, the detainees’ representative (*mumathil al-‘am*) belonged to Hamas in some prisons, where the party was in the majority.

“During the eighteen years I spent in prison,” Hassan told me, “the *mumathil al-‘am* belonged to Fatah in 90 percent of prisons and in 10 percent, to Hamas.” I met Hassan on July 26, 2012, at Jerusalem Hotel in the east of the city opposite the bus station that serves part of the West Bank. He had been released just three months earlier, at the age of thirty-eight, after eighteen years in prison. We had difficulty finding one another; he was confused on the phone and no doubt wary or surprised at my interest in such a subject, which was apparently incomprehensible. I could sense his disorientation and the mark of the years behind bars. He was huge, broadly-built, but did not really know how to act around me, a bit destabilized by the fact that I was a woman.

“I was sent to prison in 1994 for stabbing a soldier next to a mall in West Jerusalem. He was a soldier; I’m against the idea of attacking civilians. I wounded him. I did it on my own. The police caught me on the spot, handcuffed me, and took me to al-Moscobiyeh where I was interrogated. It was really tough. I was shut in a tiny three by two-meter cell. At that time, they used to put a stinking bag over your face, cuff your hands to the chair behind your back for hours, hit you, etc. They had no respect for human beings. It lasted thirty-five days. They wanted to know who had sent me, which party, etc., but I had nothing to confess. I did that in April 1994, two weeks before the entrance of the Palestinian Authority [headed by Arafat and the exiled leaders who created it] in response to Baruch Goldstein’s operation. But afterwards, in prison, I joined the PFLP wing.”

Ahmad and Hassan’s paths reflect a moment when the advances of the peace process were not perceptible to all in their day-to-day lives and when the continuation of a never-questioned colonization generated violence and provoked armed actions on the part of very young men, who decided on them at an individual level. It was their time in prison that then led to their integration into a faction.

Ahmad was thirty-six at the time of our discussion in an association in Nablus. An Arabic teacher, married with three children, his voice, the rhythm of his words, and his face gave off a great gentleness and sophistication. He began his account in the year of 1994, the year he turned eighteen:

“One day in February, at 5 A.M., Goldstein killed thirty-seven people [he in fact killed twenty-nine people and wounded twenty-five more] in the Hebron mosque. At noon in Rafidia, one of my friends was killed by the army. I was very shocked. That made me deeply sad. We were carrying out peaceful actions and they were killing us. I didn’t understand and I wanted to do something. There was a police station in the town center. A month later, I went and shot a soldier in the head. He didn’t die but ended up handicapped. They opened fire on me, then arrested me. I was sentenced to nine years and released in 2003. At first, I spent eight months in the Ramleh [prison] hospital, then I was sent to Nablus prison, then seven others. I was transferred almost every year. I passed my high school diploma in prison, then began my Political Sciences studies by correspondence for four years, but when I wanted to enroll in a course specializing in communications and digital networks, the prison warden refused. He considered this course dangerous. All

material support from the PA, with the creation of a Department in charge of Prisoners’ Affairs within the Social Affairs Ministry in 1994, then of a Ministry of Prisoners’ Affairs in 1998. Over time, the Ministry’s field of action and its financial aid to prisoners during incarceration and on release grew. For the PA and Fatah, there is a central national and political dimension to this socio-economic role vis-à-vis detainees given detention’s hold over society. Since the 2007 Hamas/Fatah split, however, Hamas and Islamic Jihad detainees (outside the PLO) are no longer eligible for this aid after their release. Within Fatah, this role is perceived by some as constituting a social and humanitarian approach to the prisoner question that eludes the political, and all the more so as, since the Second Intifada, the PA has rarely managed to negotiate their release. This political marginalization of detainees has thus been more acute for Fatah members in the sense that it has come from their own camp, and in which they have become caught up vis-à-vis the other factions in their party’s contradictions and impasses regarding the peace process. It has been exacerbated too by the whittling of their prison branch during the Oslo years, contrary to those of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which organized and asserted a partisan cohesion beyond the walls, and of the PFLP prison branch which has remained steady.

The al-Aqsa Intifada (2000–2007). A New Prison Management: Working on Consciences and Subjectivities: The End of Borders

To smash the unarmed civilian uprising of the First Intifada, Yitzhak Rabin’s politics and slogans called for the brutal use of physical violence; that is, mass arrests and torture. With the al-Aqsa Intifada (2000–2006), the aim, rather, was to destroy Palestinian consciences. The inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza were little involved in this Second Intifada, which rapidly turned into an armed resistance on the part of all factions and in particular the religious parties (Hamas and above all Islamic Jihad), but also Fatah, which Arafat let develop with the creation of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in 2000. It was accompanied by an unprecedented wave of suicide attacks (martyrdom operations) carried out by the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and the military wings of Hamas (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and the Islamic Jihad (Al-Quds Brigades). In April 2002, during Operation Defensive Shield, the Israeli authorities militarily reinvaded towns and villages in the West Bank to attack the armed groups and the Palestinian security forces. They sieged the PA institutions and Yasser Arafat, who took refuge in the Muqata’a, the presidential headquarters in Ramallah. In addition to the highly mediatized Wall, whose construction was launched in 2002 while the one already cordoning off the Gaza Strip was reinforced, and which was basically a foil, giving the illusion of a border between the West Bank and Israel, the West Bank was cut up into about a hundred enclaves, essentially around Palestinian towns and villages on both sides of the Wall. As it progressively withdrew from the heart of the Palestinian localities, the army deployed a network of checkpoints and obstacles destined to keep a stranglehold on these enclaves and to control Palestinian movement. The Israeli Defense Force’s policy of encirclement (*keter*—Hebrew) constituted what it called “territorial cells” and isolated the Palestinian towns and villages from each other. This was added to Oslo’s territorial division into Areas A, B, and C. The Gaza Strip constituted one of these cells, with the strictly surveilled and restricted entry and exit of goods and people, which became even tighter with the blockade introduced in 2007 when Hamas took over. With the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli leaders adopted the idea that the solution to the conflict was military, not political. The hegemony of a military solution translated into new particularly violent military strategies and, in the post-Second Intifada period, into the full redeployment of territorial, military, and institutional mechanisms. Re-drawn after the First Intifada, the 1967 borderlines were dismantled. After 2002, along with closures, the IDF’s regular incursions and targeted assassinations, mass arrests permitted the management of the Palestinian enclaves from afar. For the Israeli government, the aim was no longer a negotiated solution but to manage the conflict while pursuing the colonization of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Control was projected onto the territory of the other, well beyond the so-called separation Wall.

One of these mechanisms was the deployment of a veritable prison web in the Palestinian Territories and

weakened the national movement. There was a great deal of voluntary work in the health domain, for example, an alternative education when the universities were shut [during the First Intifada]. The universities played a central national role. But then everything started going downhill. The presence of the Authority [PA or Sulta] undermined individual responsibility; why would you go and volunteer when there was a Health Ministry? At university, the Fatah students no longer played a national role; they defended Fatah and the action of the Authority vis-à-vis the other parties. Prisoners heard about diverse negotiations, corruption [fasad], values were weakened, and democracy in prison too. Some started asserting regional and local solidarities and issues. In certain prisons, elections were no longer held every year. They were no longer secret; Shabas knew when they took place, who won, etc. Shabas entered people's lives; some prisoners now meet with it directly even though that was forbidden in the past."

The authoritarianism and networks of influence were perceived as an extension of the PLO-in-exile's non-democratic practices versus the Prisoners' Movement' and the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories' political prison culture. "We worked from the inside democratically," he added. "We held elections for student councils, municipalities, inside the prisons. They, in Tunis, negotiated compromises between the different factions. They didn't hold elections."

Many ex-detainees, and particularly those from Fatah, returned to, or obtained a place in the PLO and above all in the Palestinian Authority (PA) administration set up in 1994: in certain ministries, and particularly in the police and the different branches of the security services, which initially recruited exclusively Fatah members. That was not the case for ex-detainees from the left-wing or Islamic opposition parties, however. The former most often found themselves in the NGO sector that developed in this period, and constituted a competing realm of institutionalization. The Fatah prisoners did not, however, access positions of responsibility on a par with their former political clout. Most Fatah members from inside the Occupied Territories were for several reasons supplanted by Fatah members in exile. Like in other sectors, a "logic of return" prevailed on in the police and security services. Jobs in the PA made it possible for PLO veterans and leaders to return. Nearly all the officers were from the ranks of the exile forces. In addition to this logic of return was the importance of interpersonal relations when attributing the most political positions. As for other highly-skilled positions, those having spent long years in detention were at a disadvantage because they had completed less higher education at a time when degrees and diplomas were taken as the measure of one's competence and determined access to the higher echelons of the civil services, even if their carceral experience was considered equivalent in certain sectors, where their knowledge and expertise were recognized. They thus largely invested the Ministry of Prisoners' Affairs but were relatively underrepresented elsewhere.

Only a handful of Fatah members remained behind bars after 1997. They were doubly marginalized in detention, both vis-à-vis the other detainees defending an oppositional line, and their partisan apparatus for whom the political epicenter had shifted to the institutional construction of the PA. In the West Bank and Gaza, this was all the more the case as they were gradually squeezed out of the decision-making positions in their party and did not regain them in the PA or the PLO. A decisive figure in the Prisoners' Movement, Qaddura Fares, described this sidelining:

"All those who were released were pushed out of the decision-making circles. Are there any prisoners in the Executive Committee [of the PLO], the National Council [the PLO parliament], the Central Council? No, there are not [there are few]. It's been like that from the start. There are two schools: the Tunis school and the Palestine school. Why did Arafat accept Oslo? Because people convinced him that there was a group in Palestine who challenged his leadership. It was a huge error for him to come back before the Accords on the final status had been signed. There is a problem regarding the role of prisoners. They were given a salary [rateb – a monthly allowance], work, and a whole host of things, but they didn't think to give them a role in political decisions. In Hamas, they had more clout. In the PFLP too; as you can see, Saadat [the General Secretary of the party] is in prison."

Since Oslo, all political detainees and ex-detainees in Israel, whatever their political affiliation, have enjoyed

my books were taken away from me and I had to drop everything. I started again after my release. In 2006, I was held in administrative detention for a year because I was active in the Ansar al-Sajin association [close to Hamas], which had a branch here that got shut down at that time, then I worked in other associations. I continued to be involved in human rights, I helped prisoners' families. In November 2010, the PA came to get me. I was judged in military court and sentenced to a year and a half; they thought I was with Hamas."

While he claimed not to belong to Hamas, his activities in Ansar al-Sajin and the people he introduced me to, attested to a proximity with this party, which developed during his first period in detention at a time when Hamas was predominant and structured Inside.

The Oslo Ruptures

For the Prisoners' Movement, Oslo is represented as a major historical rupture, a setback, and a period of cultural regression related to the political turning point that impacted the national movement on the Outside following the creation of the Palestinian Authority. Yet the transformations set in motion were only fully felt by the following generation—that of the al-Aqsa Intifada—which found itself massively behind bars from the early 2000s on, often left to its own devices and with little support vis-à-vis the prison services. The Oslo moment had very distinct repercussions according to the factions, and above all marked the beginning of a process of fragmentation of the national movement Inside and Outside. Moreover, releases, which were announced in waves, dragged on over three years. This timeframe generated strong disapprobation. Between those whose release was delayed, and the more or less active and violent opposants to the peace process sent to prison, Israel's penitentiaries did not empty: over 4,000 people were still in detention at the end of November 1995, and there were already over 2,000 in April 1999 on the eve of the al-Aqsa Intifada.



In 1994–1995, when Shawan Jabarin was in Jneid, 70 percent of the prisoners belonged to Fatah:

"There was no clear agreement. Only some were released. We got the impression that it depended on the whim of the Israelis. People said: 'Why are we still here if Abu Ammar [Yasser Arafat] is in Palestine?' It changed the atmosphere, efforts dwindled, the prisoners thought of themselves, became individualistic. Before, things were collective. So-and-so wanted to eat alone; another wanted a television for himself to watch what he liked. People started to withdraw into themselves and that created a whole host of problems, right up until now."

Indeed, from that point on, television culture took over an environment previously structured by the written word. Education and training began to lose their alternative dimension as a militant counter-model, henceforth being seen in terms of individual trajectories and as a form of social mobility. The political stakes of enrolling at the Tel Aviv Open University were debated, inscriptions now seen as a form of institutional normalization (tatbich). The prisoners repeatedly requested to be allowed to enroll in Palestinian and overseas universities, in vain. This request was indeed one of the reasons behind the 1995, and then the 2004 hunger strikes. With no other choice, those who wished to study, and who received Shabas' approval, began university courses at the Tel Aviv Open University. This possibility was reserved for those serving long sentences and is still considered a privilege by the prison services, granted if the security officers attest to good behavior. Only certain disciplines are authorized—literary subjects, political studies, sociology, economics, psychology, and management—not the sciences, I.T., or any other subject considered to present a security risk. Specializing in the sciences at high-school diploma level is also forbidden. Studies are also fee-paying and in Hebrew, which limits their access all the more, even if the PA prisoners' program progressively began to cover the inscription fees.

Over time, the non-fulfillment of the political promise of sovereignty expected from a peace process, the progressive installation of political and economic networks of interest and corruption, then the PA's authoritarian drift have had disastrous repercussions on the Prisoners' Movement and exacerbated the fault lines between prison and diaspora leaders.

"We are in the mire, caught in a honeytrap. The ministries, the cars, and all that were a trap, one that



Posters by Marc Rudin / Jihad Mansour for the PFLP